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 ABSTRACT	  
Entrepreneurship is important to both the economy and society and so it is in the global 
public interest to reduce the high failure rate of entrepreneurs. At the core of building a new 
venture is the process of planning how to go from the current to a future state. Empirical 
research seeking to answer the question of how entrepreneurs best plan has focused on measuring 
the impact of planning on new venture performance. Despite decades of research, the results have 
been very inconclusive. This does not surprise given that entrepreneurial planning and how it can 
be measured have never been explored in depth. Instead, many quantitative researchers have 
simply assumed that planning equals having a written business plan. To overcome the current 
inconclusiveness and ultimately to provide entrepreneurs with prescriptions as to how to best 
plan, we must improve our understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
This thesis addresses this gap. Different streams of literature were combined to create a 
theoretical framework that, in theory, would explain entrepreneurial planning. Qualitative case 
research was then conducted to confront these a priori constructs with empirical data. By 
iterating through the hermeneutical circle and continuously moving between theory and data, an 
improved understanding and a refined framework gradually emerged. 
The refined framework highlights antecedents, issues, sequences of actions and outcomes of 
entrepreneurial planning as well as the role of entrepreneurs and other planners in the planning 
process. It showed that, for the cases studied, measuring planning in terms of having a written 
business plan would neither account for the many forms in which entrepreneurial planning can 
occur nor for planning process and process outcome as two separate dimensions. Writing a 
traditional business plan was found to be useful in communicating the business model to external 
people not familiar with the industry in which the venture was operating. However, 
entrepreneurs saw no other reasons to engage in such planning because the business plan 
framework was too generic to provide any value internally. More precisely, the cases showed that 
the planning requirements were industry-specific. This clearly indicates that scholars conducting 
future quantitative studies testing the benefits of planning need to account for these different 
types of planning in different contexts, possibly by establishing archetypes of new ventures. 
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1 INTRODUCTION	  
This introductory chapter outlines the background to this research, the research problem and the 
associated research questions. It also introduces the methodology employed to answer these 
questions, and the cases studied. Finally, an outline and diagrammatic representation of the 
structure of this thesis is included. 
1.1 Background	  of	  the	  thesis	  
By developing, evaluating and exploiting new, untried market opportunities, entrepreneurs create 
employment as well as wealth and are at the core of economic growth (Minniti & Lévesque, 
2010, p. 312; OECD, 2011). However, starting a new venture is not an easy task. Most new 
businesses fail within five years (Castrogiovanni, 1996). Given the importance of 
entrepreneurship to both economy and society, it is of prime interest to provide entrepreneurs 
with the best advice as to how to turn an opportunity into a viable business. At the core of this 
activity is the planning of how to go from the current to a future state (Gruber, 2007). To 
answer the question of how entrepreneurs best plan, scholars have provided conflicting advice. 
On one hand, it is believed that extensive planning implies greater business success for new 
ventures (Burke, Fraser, & Greene, 2010). Often it is argued that such planning increases the 
“capability to identify a business opportunity and devise a strategy to exploit it and/or secure 
resources to achieve these ends” (Burke et al., 2010, p. 394). As a result, many universities 
worldwide support extensive planning and the development of a business plan. In 
entrepreneurship classes, students are taught about the importance of having a business plan and 
how to write such plans. A study of the top 100 U.S. business schools found that 78 schools 
offered courses “devoted to understanding market research techniques, competitive analyses 
based on received wisdom in strategic management and financial valuation methods based on 
calculations of risk-adjusted expected returns” (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2009, p. 
287) and designed to teach students how to write a business plans (Honig, 2004, p. 258). 
Leading entrepreneurship educators rated the writing of a business plan as the most important 
feature in their entrepreneurship courses (Hills, 1988, p. 119). Moreover, many universities host 
business plan competitions, including Harvard, Stanford, Wharton and MIT (Honig, 2004, p. 
259). But educators are not the only actors that stimulate a planning euphoria in the 
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entrepreneurship domain. Management consultants, governmental assistance agencies and a wide 
array of literature encourage entrepreneurs to develop a business plan. Hence, it does not surprise 
that many entrepreneurs equate new firm creation with planning extensively and writing a 
business plan, which leads to the creation of approximately 10 million business plans per year 
(Gumpert, 2002). 
On the other hand, extensive planning is a very time-consuming task. New firms face very high 
resource constraints (Brinckmann, Grichnik, & Kapsa, 2010@26) and therefore the opportunity 
costs for such a laborious task are high (Gifford, 1992). Moreover, real-life stories question the 
value of such extensive planning. For instance, Apple Computer started as a mail order business 
operating out of a garage and no formal plans were developed initially. On the other hand, Fred 
Smith of Federal Express spent years developing and refining a business plan. The plan hinged 
on his primary customer, the Federal Reserve, with whom he eventually chose not to proceed. He 
then had to abandon the whole plan and change his entire business model. Microsoft is said to 
have burst into prominence not because of any great business plan but rather because Bill Gates 
seized an unexpected opportunity to develop the IBM PC's operating system (Castrogiovanni, 
1996, p. 802). Besides Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, Michael Dell is also said to have started his 
business without a business plan (Karlsson & Honig, 2009, p. 28). 
When scholars realised that such conceptual arguing would not provide the answer to the 
question of how entrepreneurs are best advised to plan, researchers decided to take a more 
objective approach. More precisely, scholars started to measure the impact of planning on new 
venture performance with quantitative methods. Surprisingly, despite decades of inquiring, the 
results have pointed “inconclusively to any association between business plans and venture 
performance” (Burke et al., 2010, p. 392) and an “intense debate” (Brinckmann et al., 2010, p. 
24) still surrounds the question of how entrepreneurs are best advised to plan. 
1.2 Research	  questions	  and	  empirical	  setting	  
This inconclusiveness is not surprising given that theory testing has preceded theory building 
(Dencker, Gruber, & Shah, 2009). More precisely, empirical research in this field has almost 
exclusively employed survey methodology (Karlsson & Honig, 2009) measuring the planning 
performance relationship. The understanding of planning that underpinned these studies has 
been both limited (Burke et al., 2010) and based on assumptions rather than theory. 
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This thesis seeks to deepen our understanding of entrepreneurial planning by drawing on 
qualitative case research. Qualitative research is suitable for theory building and case research as 
the chosen research strategy is appropriate in answering questions where other methodologies 
struggle (Gartner & Birley, 2002) and in producing a holistic understanding (Stake, 2010, p. 
48). 
1.3 Structure	  
Figure 1 summarises the remainder of this thesis, which is organised as follows. Chapter 2 
reviews four different streams of literature concerned with different aspects of entrepreneurial 
planning. The theory reviewed, combined with other constructs, is used to develop a theoretical 
framework that explains the process of entrepreneurial planning in theory. Chapter 3 outlines the 
methodology used in this research to confront this theoretical framework with empirical data. 
Chapter 4 presents the cases along the dimensions of the theoretical framework. The observations 
from these cases are analysed in Chapter 5 to build and develop theory. Lastly, Chapter 6 
highlights academic as well as managerial contributions of this new theory and suggests areas for 
future research. 
  13 
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis 
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2 LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
Fields of academic research have looked at narrow aspects of entrepreneurial planning but none 
has provided a holistic picture of how entrepreneurial planning unfolds. This chapter reviews 
these fields and their contribution to an understanding of the process of entrepreneurial 
planning. At the end of this chapter, the findings of this review are integrated in a holistic 
framework that can then be used to develop existing theory by confronting it with empirical data. 
2.1 Academic	  fields	  and	  approaches	  
Scholars have approached entrepreneurial planning from various angles. One stream of research 
has focused on understanding the nature of entrepreneurial planning as a multidimensional 
construct. Entrepreneurship scholars closer to the discipline of strategic management have 
investigated different planning modes in which entrepreneurs operate. Lastly, scholars with a 
more empirical background have attempted to measure the impact of various planning 
approaches on new venture performance. These three streams of literature are reviewed in the 
following sections. 
2.1.1 Delineation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  entrepreneurial	  planning	  
Before developing a framework to understand how entrepreneurial planning unfolds, it is 
important to understand what entrepreneurial planning is. Whereas strategic management 
scholars have studied the delineation of the phenomenon of planning in large and established 
firms, very little theory-generating research has been produced in the context of new ventures. 
One exception is Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart’s (2011) conceptual framework shown in Figure 
2. At the core of the authors’ framework is the notion of entrepreneurial planning as a 
multidimensional construct with three dimensions: strategy making, business modelling and 
tactical planning. 
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Figure 2: Strategy making, business modelling and tactical planning 
 
Note. Reprinted from Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2011, p. 204) 
2.1.1.1 Strategy	  making,	  business	  modelling	  and	  tactical	  planning	  
A business model is often defined as the “logic of the firm” (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 
2011). In particular, Teece (2010, p. 172) reported that business models explain “how a business 
creates and delivers value to customers” and “outlines the architecture of revenues, costs, and 
profits associated with the business enterprise delivering that value”. 
The notion of strategy being the logic behind business modelling decisions is compatible with 
findings in very recent entrepreneurial planning literature. Mullins & Komisar (2010) reported 
that successful entrepreneurs do not just execute a business model, rather they “embark on a 
learning journey”, which may lead to a very different destination referred to as ‘Plan B’. Hence, 
what remains constant is strategy, or in other words, the content and processes that underpin the 
business model.  
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart defined the third dimension, tactical planning, as “residual choices 
open to a firm by virtue of the business model that it employs” (p. 202). Similar to the notion of 
strategies constraining the number of business models to be chosen from, the chosen business 
model has a limited range of tactics that can be employed. Business models of competitors often 
interact with each other through tactics such as price battles or marketing strategies. Tactical 
planning is more day-to-day planning on a lower level than business modelling or strategy 
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making. 
2.1.1.2 Implications	  of	  the	  theory	  reviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  
The framework presented is useful in better understanding the nature of entrepreneurial 
planning as a process that can unfold on several levels. Whereas the distinction between business 
modelling and tactical planning is easy to relate to, separating business modelling and strategy 
making could prove to be unpractical. Data may show that the vision is the strategy and all 
higher-level planning that is informed by the vision is unfolding on the level of business 
modelling. 
To conclude, the theory presented allows for an abstract understanding of the nature of 
entrepreneurial planning. However, it reveals little about how entrepreneurial planning unfolds 
on a more concrete and detailed level. 
2.1.2 Planning	  modes	  in	  new	  ventures	  
On a less abstract level, the planning modes presented in this section and summarised in Table 1 
represent various ‘logics’ that underpin planning processes. These modes range from being 
descriptive to prescriptive and have their origin in strategic management as well as 
entrepreneurship literature. The first three sections review strategic management theory relevant 
to the entrepreneurial context. These three modes of planning – the design mode, the 
entrepreneurial mode and the learning mode – were established by Mintzberg et al. (2005). The 
next two sections discuss modes that are rooted in entrepreneurship literature: McGrath & 
MacMillan’s (1995) discovery mode and Sarasvathy’s (2009) effectuation mode. The last section 
reviews these modes in view of the purpose of this research. 
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Table 1: Different modes of planning in new ventures 
	   Design	  mode	   Entrepreneurial	  
mode	  
Learning	  mode	   Discovery	  mode	   Effectuation	  
mode	  
Underlying	  
logic	  
rationality	   intuition	   incrementalism	   experimentation	   effectuation	  
Path	   deliberate	  /	  plan	  
(informal)	  
deliberate	  /	  plan	   emergent	  /	  
pattern	  
deliberate	  and	  
emergent	  /	  plan	  
and	  pattern	  
emergent	  /	  
pattern	  
Planning	  
activity	  
analysing,	  
selecting	  among	  
static	  
configurations,	  
executing	  
formulating	  (black	  
box)	  and	  
promoting	  vision	  
collective	  learning	   testing	  
assumptions	  to	  
reduce	  
uncertainty	  
doing	  the	  doable	  
with	  the	  means	  
available	  
Decision	  
maker	  
entrepreneur	   entrepreneur	   different	  
organisational	  
members	  
entrepreneur	   entrepreneur	  
Given	  
process	  
yes	   no	   no	   yes	   no	  
Learning	   no	   partly	   yes	   yes	   yes	  
Decision	   	   top	  -­‐>	  down	   top	  -­‐>	  down	   top	  <-­‐>	  down	   top	  -­‐>	  down	   top	  -­‐>	  down	  
Expected	  to	  
be	  suitable	  
for	  
non-­‐innovative	  
new	  ventures	  
operating	  in	  
stable	  and	  
predictable	  
environments	  and	  
existing	  markets	  
new	  ventures	  
with	  an	  
experienced	  and	  
visionary	  founder	  
with	  great	  
intuition	  
new	  ventures	  
offering	  
professional	  
services	  
innovative	  new	  
ventures	  
operating	  under	  
uncertainty	  
innovative	  new	  
ventures	  
operating	  under	  
uncertainty	  
Literature	   prescriptive	   descriptive	   descriptive	   prescriptive	   descriptive	  and	  
prescriptive	  
 
2.1.2.1 Design	  mode:	  a	  process	  of	  conception	  
In the design mode, planning is a simple, clear and deliberate process. As shown in Figure 3, the 
process is one of rational decision making taking place “as a linear progression from initial 
aspiration to final result” (Sminia, 2009, p. 98). The formulation of plans in this mode “must 
not only take precedence over action but must precede it in time”(Mintzberg, 1990, p. 181). 
Therefore, formulation and implementation are clearly separated. 
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Figure 3: The design mode of planning 
 
Note. Reprinted from Mintzberg (1994, p. 37) 
For the formulation part, the design mode emerged with a specific, prescriptive framework in 
mind, the SWOT model (Farjoun, 2002). In this model, strategy is constructed by matching 
environmental opportunities and threats with the firm’s internal resources and distinctive 
competencies, all in the light of the firm’s goals and objectives (Andrews, 1971). This approach 
assists decision makers in producing a strategy and business model that exploits environmental 
opportunities and defends environmental threats as well as takes advantage of the firm's strengths 
and neutralises its weaknesses (Barney, 1997). 
The design mode underpins the traditional business plan framework promoted by many 
educators, government agents and textbook writers (Honig, 2004). This popularity is not 
surprising given that in this mode the complex process of planning is simplified and therefore 
easier to teach and understand. Moreover, in this mode, formulation is separated from 
implementation and therefore the formulation part can be taught in class completely isolated 
from implementation. 
While these features make the design school suitable for teaching, critics have quite rightly 
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pointed out that since the design school emerged in 1957, this school has not adapted to reflect 
new findings in strategy and planning research, which were very well summarised in Farjoun’s 
(2002) article. Planning in this mode becomes a selection among static configurations and has 
been described as linear, unidirectional and fragmented (Farjoun, 2002). There is no feedback, 
learning or interaction involved, plans are expected to “come out of the design process fully 
developed” (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 39). This is in sharp contrast with Mintzberg’s (1994) notion of 
the co-existence of both deliberate and emergent planning. When starting an innovative new 
venture and when, as a consequence, being exposed to uncertain environments, feedback loops 
are particularly crucial. Proponents of this mode of planning have also been criticised for their 
assumptions about directionality, which implies that structure always follows strategy and not the 
other way around. 
2.1.2.2 Entrepreneurial	  mode:	  a	  visionary	  process	  
Similar to the design mode, in the entrepreneurial mode, planning is centralised. However, in 
this mode, the focus is on the informal and implicit vision of the leader rather than on a well-
formulated plan. Instead of engaging in analytical planning activities, in this mode “a strong 
leader takes bold, risky actions” (Hart, 1992, p. 330) guided by his or her intuition, which can 
neither be fully articulated nor understood. Whereas the entrepreneur’s intuition provides a sense 
of deliberate direction, the details are planned in an emergent manner ‘en route’.  
The entrepreneurial mode also differs in the sense that it mainly provides descriptions as to how 
planning unfolds rather than giving prescriptions as to how entrepreneurs should plan. As a 
consequence, critics have predominantly put forward valid arguments as to why the 
entrepreneurial mode does not explain planning. For instance, it has been argued that if planning 
occurs inside the visionary’s head and is linked to someone’s experience and intuition then it 
occurs semiconsciously at best and will remain a black box forever. In addition, in this view other 
decision makers are ignored, which leads to the illusion that the success of a new venture merely 
depends on one person. This implies that the venture can only remain successful for the time the 
founder is managing it, which would be problematic. 
2.1.2.3 Learning	  mode:	  an	  emergent	  process	  
The learning mode as a largely descriptive perspective on the phenomenon of planning emerged 
to explain planning that was neither intended nor centralised. Some advocates of the learning 
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mode estimated that less than ten per cent of intended plans actually become realised. Instead, 
they have argued that planning is mainly an emergent pattern arising out of many little decisions 
organisational members take. The environmental complexity and uncertainty new ventures face, 
coupled with the diffusion of knowledge occurring inside the organisation, precludes deliberate 
control and therefore planning becomes a process of learning. Rather than taking the role of an 
omnipotent leader, the entrepreneur pays close attention to successful patterns that emerge out of 
this collective action. These patterns are sometimes then transformed into deliberate, and even 
formalised, plans. 
Critics, who have taken a more prescriptive stance, have argued that the lack of intended 
planning can leave the new venture with no plan at all. “Muddling through”, “purposeless" and 
“anti-strategic” were words mentioned in this context (Mintzberg et al., 2005, p. 224). In 
addition, the notion of incrementalism associated with this mode was said to lead to 
inefficiencies such as there being features of a product that no one has ever decided on. 
2.1.2.4 Discovery	  mode:	  a	  process	  of	  experimenting	  
The discovery mode holds concepts of both the design and the learning mode. Similar to the 
design mode, it maintains that planning is a rational and centralised process. At the same time, it 
draws heavily on the concept of learning. In a recent article, McGrath (2010, p. 258) pointed out 
that “the goal of a discovery-driven plan is […] to learn as much as possible at the lowest possible 
cost”. More precisely, in this mode, uncertainty is reduced by identifying, articulating and testing 
assumptions that underlie the business model. The prescriptive framework the authors promote 
includes: a “reverse income statement” to test the amount of revenue required to build a viable 
business; instructions how to benchmark against competitors and potential market demand; a 
“pro forma operations specs”, in which assumptions about the operations are specified; a “key 
assumption checklist”; and a “milestone planning chart” designed to test the assumptions at each 
stage of venture development. According to the authors, this framework allows entrepreneurs to 
test business models and iterate through them without having to spend much investment or 
time. 
Whereas the specifics of the framework seem to be more suitable for new business units in 
established firms, two other authors took the concept of discovery-driven planning and applied it 
specifically to the context of new ventures. In their highly prescriptive framework ‘Getting to 
Plan B’, Mullins & Komisar (2010) give very clear instructions as to how to test assumptions or 
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‘leaps of faith’, as they call them. The authors encouraged entrepreneurs to translate these leaps 
of faiths into testable hypotheses that would prove or refute each leap of faith as depicted in 
Figure 4. An assigned metric is used to measure the outcome. To illustrate this, an example of a 
leap of faith is the assumption that customers are willing to pay for a particular service. A testable 
hypothesis could be that ten people sign up to this service within one week. The associated 
metric is customer count. 
Figure 4: A quantitative approach to testing assumptions 
 
Note. Reprinted from Mullins & Komisar (2010, p. 4) 
The authors listed five areas in which leaps of faith need be articulated and tested in a 
quantitative manner: revenue, gross margin, operations, working capital and investment. 
Surprisingly, other, non-financial aspects of the business model that make assumptions as to how 
to create and deliver value to customers were not addressed in their prescriptive framework. 
2.1.2.5 Effectuation	  mode:	  a	  process	  of	  doing	  
In their comprehensive and ground-breaking research, Dew, Read, Sarasvathy & Wiltbank 
(2009) found that successful entrepreneurs “invert” the principles of the design school. The 
researchers first asked MBA students to think aloud while solving decision-making problems 
associated with the task of creating a new venture. Not surprisingly, the MBA students 
approached business planning following the design school methods they were taught. For 
instance, they “picked target segments based on predictive information given to them and 
followed textbook procedures in arriving at decisions on how to capture the target segments” 
(Dew et al., 2009, p. 288). On a more abstract level, the students followed what the authors 
referred to as “casual logic”. In this logic, the students started with developing goals based on 
predictions. Contingencies were avoided or hedged to make the predictions as accurate as 
possible. Then, means and casual paths to implement predetermined goals were chosen. The 
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process of planning in this logic was driven by decision making and choosing between existing 
options. Positioning was key. The key question was “What are the means needed to achieve my 
goals?” 
Surprisingly, when examining how expert entrepreneurs tackled the same decision-making 
problems, the authors found that these entrepreneurs ‘inverted casual logic’ and did the opposite. 
Whereas the students started with a goal and then selected the means they needed to achieve this 
goal, the entrepreneurs started with the means they had without any bigger picture or vision in 
mind. They focused on small problems they could fix with these means and did not engage in 
analytical activities such as calculating the overall odds of their efforts resulting in a successful 
new venture. All they knew at that point was that they probably could fix this problem and by 
doing something they would make a difference, which raises the odds of being successful to some 
unknown degree. In the process of “doing the doable”, goals gradually emerged. 
Figure 5 illustrates this in more practical terms. The MBA students started with the end state 
they desired to achieve. Using their analytical skills and tools, they then engaged in market 
definition, segmentation, targeting and positioning to finally reach the customer. On the other 
hand, expert entrepreneurs met people with problems. They asked themselves whether, with the 
means they had, they could solve this problem. As they were solving problems, they met more 
people with similar or different problems they could solve. They kept innovating and started to 
partner up with other people. Market segments became clearer and so did the often new and 
unanticipated market they found themselves operating in. Similarly, when it came to financial 
planning, instead of calculating future cash flows or returns on investment, expert entrepreneurs 
focused on the ‘downside’ and how much they could afford to lose. 
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Figure 5: Marketing in the design mode and in the effectuation mode 
 
Note. Reprinted from Sarasvathy (2009, p. 39) 
The authors called this modus operandi ‘effectual logic’. They argued that entrepreneurs operate 
in this logic because they are facing three types of uncertainty – (1) Knightian uncertainty or the 
problem of unknown probability distributions and even outcomes, which make it impossible to 
predict outcomes, (2) goal ambiguity or the problem that preferences are neither given nor well 
ordered and (3) isotropy or the problem of not knowing which elements of the environments 
they should pay attention to and which to ignore. According to the authors, given these 
uncertainties, it did not make sense to start the planning with predicting the future. Rather, 
entrepreneurs operating in the logic of effectuation started with the means they had as shown in 
Figure 6. Or in the authors’ words, the entrepreneurs proceed “outward from means and causes 
to new effects and unanticipated ends” (Dew et al., 2009, p. 288) and “emphasis […] is on 
creating something new with existing means rather than discovering new ways to achieve given 
goals” (Sarasvathy, 2009, p. 5). It is casual reasoning reversed as depicted in Figure 7 outlining 
more detailed decision-making processes in both modes. 
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Figure 6: Casual versus effectual logic 
 
Note. Adapted from Sarasvathy (2009) 
Figure 7: Casual versus effectual cycle 
 
Note. Reprinted from Read et al. (2009, p. 4) 
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To conclude, casual logic and effectual logic were presented as a dichotomy. Nevertheless, as the 
authors acknowledged, in the real world entrepreneurs operate in both logics, usually with a 
tendency towards effectual logic. This is paralleled by another study, which found that both 
processes are likely to be at work to some extent when planning (Read et al., 2009, p. 4). 
2.1.2.6 Implications	  of	  the	  theory	  reviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  
The planning modes presented provide great insights into the ‘logics’ that underpin planning 
processes. Some theories reviewed even made suggestions how the rough outlines of the planning 
process could look like. However, many questions remain open. For instance, can entrepreneurs 
plan in various modes simultaneously? Are these modes tied to certain planning issues or 
antecedents such as the context the venture is operating in? How does the process look like in 
detail and what are the outcomes of the process? Fortunately, the planning mode theory provides 
the foundation needed for a more detailed examination of these and other questions expected to 
lead to a better understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
2.1.3 Measuring	  the	  planning	  performance	  relationship	  
Whereas the literature presented above has mainly been descriptive, entrepreneurship scholars 
have also given prescriptions as to whether entrepreneurs should plan or not. In order to produce 
such prescriptions, researchers have measured the impact of planning on new venture 
performance. Appendix B lists the independent and dependent variable as well as the result, 
context and dataset of all quantitative studies that were conducted in this field and published in 
top journals since the year 2000. Surprisingly, as a whole, the results are most inconclusive 
indicating a positive as well as a negative and in some cases even no relationship between 
planning and new venture performance. 
Those who found a positive relationship have put forward conceptual arguments explaining how 
planning benefits new ventures. On the other hand, in studies indicating a negative relationship, 
the drawbacks of planning were outlined. The first section discusses these arguments. The second 
section is concerned with moderators of the planning performance relationship that were 
introduced to overcome the aforementioned inconclusiveness. The last section reviews how such 
theory testing has contributed to an understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
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2.1.3.1 Arguments	  for	  and	  against	  planning	  
Many scholars measuring the impact of planning on new venture performance presented 
conceptual arguments supporting their empirical findings. These scholars can be put into two 
camps: pro and contra planning. The following reviews the arguments of these two camps. In 
addition, a comprehensive list of arguments put forward is provided in Appendix A. 
2.1.3.1.1 Benefits	  of	  planning	  
The benefits of planning can be put into two categories. 
First, a written business plan is assumed to help new ventures increase the level of new resources. 
Such a plan can make the new venture appear structured, well planned as well as established 
(Karlsson & Honig, 2009). Hence, it can legitimate new, unproven businesses to advisors or 
potential managers and facilitate the acquisition of major clients as well as convince potential 
suppliers (Delmar & Shane, 2004; Lange, Mollov, Pearlmutter, Singh, & Bygrave, 2007; 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). More importantly, such a plan may facilitate the acquisition of 
resources by providing “a screening function for financiers” (Burke et al., 2010, p. 395). 
Second, going through the process of writing a business plan is said to enhance the efficacy of 
existing resources. Burke et al. (2010) suggested that a written business plan raises 
entrepreneurial capabilities and “can make a positive impact on new venture performance by 
increasing the capability to identify a business opportunity and devise a strategy to exploit it 
and/or secure resources to achieve these ends” (p. 394). Moreover, such a plan “may actually 
support improvisational activities by enhancing entrepreneurial decision making” (p. 406), may 
improve “managerial capabilities to learn and introduce new routines” (p. 406) and finally “can 
highlight the difficulty of predicting market uncertainties and hence actually prime entrepreneurs 
to think and respond more effectively” (p. 394). Other studies that looked at the benefits of 
planning as a process found that planning helps identify goals to accomplish (Liao & Gartner, 
2006), turn these goals into concrete operational steps and attain these steps (Delmar & Shane, 
2003). In addition, planning is said to enhance the analysis of complex activities (Shane & 
Delmar, 2004), enable quicker decision making than through trial-and-error learning (Delmar & 
Shane, 2003) and encourage entrepreneurs to use tools that prevent time-consuming bottlenecks 
due to bad planning, 
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2.1.3.1.2 Drawbacks	  of	  planning	  
Given that writing a business plan is a very time-consuming task of 200 hours or more (Lange et 
al., 2007, p. 238), the opportunity costs for writing such a plan are high. Opponents of writing a 
business plan argue that the costs of writing such a plan are higher than the benefits and that 
entrepreneurs benefit more from relying on their intuition (Delmar & Shane, 2003). In 
particular, such planning was said to lead to lengthy decision processes (Gruber, 2007), hinder 
flexibility and agility (Dencker et al., 2009), create a false illusion of control (Dencker et al., 
2009) and stifle creativity (Gruber, 2007). 
2.1.3.2 Moderators	  of	  the	  planning	  performance	  relationship	  
To overcome the inconclusive results produced by studies measuring the impact of planning on 
performance, scholars have introduced moderators. The following presents the most important of 
these moderators. A more comprehensive list of all moderators used since 2000 is provided in 
Appendix C. 
2.1.3.2.1 Environmental	  uncertainty	  
Gruber (2007) reported that extensive marketing planning was more beneficial under less 
environmental uncertainty. His findings indicated a negative moderating effect of uncertainty on 
the planning performance relationship. This view was shared by Bhide (2000, p. 59) who argued 
that “entrepreneurs cannot expect, in uncertain businesses, to gather reliable data on potential 
demand and competition”. Other scholars found contrasting empirical evidence. Burke et al. 
(2010, p. 406) reported that particularly in more uncertain contexts, a written business plan 
appears to be important because it enhances entrepreneurial decision making and has benefits “in 
terms of improving the managerial capabilities to learn and introduce new routines”. These 
opposed results do not surprise considering that previous studies have not accounted for the fact 
that environmental uncertainty is a very vague term and can mean many things. Given that 
environmental uncertainty is the moderator most often used, it is important to investigate this 
issue in more detail. 
Milliken (1987), a strategic management scholar, wrote a comprehensive conceptual paper 
entirely devoted to the concept of environmental uncertainty. He suggested that environmental 
uncertainty has three dimensions – state, effect and response uncertainty. Matthews (1995, p. 
35ff), who built on his research, summarised Milliken’s findings: 
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State uncertainty refers to the inability to understand or to predict the state of the 
environment […] Effect uncertainty refers to uncertainty over what the 
consequences of environmental changes will be on the organization. […] Finally, 
response uncertainty relates to organizational response options.  
When applying these dimensions to the context of new ventures, only one of these three 
dimensions is assumed to be of real relevance. Because of the relative simplicity of such firms, one 
would assume that it is rather easy to estimate how a given change will affect the organisation 
(effect uncertainty) and what options entrepreneurs have to respond to this change (response 
uncertainty). In contrast, the inability to predict futures states of the environment is likely to 
have a significant impact on the benefit of planning, particularly in the context of innovative new 
ventures introducing novelty to a market. 
Such environmental uncertainty should not be confused with environmental dynamism. Instead, 
as shown in Figure 8 and elaborated by Davis, Eisenhardt & Bingham (2009), environmental 
uncertainty is one of several dimensions of environmental dynamism. The other dimensions are 
velocity, complexity and ambiguity. Velocity is “the speed or rate at which new opportunities 
emerge” (p. 420), which, particularly for certain types of new ventures such as Internet startups, 
is expected to have an influence on planning of the same magnitude as state uncertainty. 
Similarly, complexity, “the number of opportunity contingencies that must [be] addressed 
successfully” (p. 420), can impact planning in certain industries characterised by many scientific, 
regulatory, safety or commercial requirements. Lastly, ambiguity or the “lack of clarity, such that 
it is difficult to interpret or distinguish opportunities” (p. 420) is, relatively to other dimensions, 
expected to have less impact on the planning process. 
  29 
Figure 8: Uncertainty as one of four dimensions of environmental dynamism 
 
To conclude, the moderating effects of environmental uncertainty have pointed in very different 
directions. This section sought to establish a better understanding of the various dimensions of 
environmental uncertainty and make predictions as to which of these dimensions are expected to 
impact entrepreneurial planning significantly. 
2.1.3.2.2 Newness	  of	  the	  firm	  
The stage of development of the venture is the second most popular moderator. Emerging firms 
face relatively big trade-offs when allocating limited resources to planning instead of investing 
these resources in other value-creating activities (Brinckmann et al., 2010, p. 36). Nevertheless, it 
was found that the newness of a firm has a positive moderating impact on the planning 
performance relationship (Brinckmann et al., 2010). For instance, Shane & Delmar (2004, p. 
781) showed that “new ventures are less likely to be terminated if the entrepreneurs complete 
business plans before initiating marketing and promotion and before talking to customers”. 
Gruber (2007, p. 801) reported that new firm creation is a “complex and fuzzy task” and 
planning “helps entrepreneurs to stretch cognitive limitations and to manage greater amounts of 
information”. Moreover, in emerging firms, the time span between planning and feedback is 
much shorter and more transparent, which is said to allow for more efficient planning (Delmar 
& Shane, 2003; Gruber, 2007; Locke & Latham, 1980). Lastly, it was argued that planning is 
Environmental	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very useful for entrepreneurs because it facilitates a better understanding of the relationship 
between intention, action and performance (Gruber, 2007; Matthews & Scott, 1995) and it 
helps set out milestones as well as develop the actions to be taken to reach those milestones in a 
timely manner (Block & MacMillan, 1985; Gruber, 2007). 
In summary, academic evidence has suggested that the newer the firm, the more it benefits from 
planning. This highlights the importance of studying entrepreneurial planning over time. 
2.1.3.2.3 Formal	  output	  
As a third moderator, the formal output of the planning process was identified in one of the few 
studies that made a clear distinction between planning as a process and business plan as a formal 
output of this process. Empirical evidence suggested that having a written business plan had a 
positive moderating effect on performance (Brinckmann et al., 2010). Several authors have 
suggested conceptual arguments supporting this effect. Shane & Delmar (2004) wrote that such 
a plan improves the entrepreneur’s effort to gather and analyse information from customers. 
However, this might not apply to all types of new ventures. As described above, entrepreneurs 
introducing novelty are often exposed to state uncertainty and particularly when creating new 
markets, such information cannot be obtained. In addition, Brinckmann et al. (2010) pointed 
out that a business plan helps entrepreneurs communicate information about their business. This 
is supported by other studies in which it was found that a written plan helps increase credibility 
to various stakeholders and investors (Burke et al., 2010; Delmar & Shane, 2004; Karlsson & 
Honig, 2009; Lange et al., 2007, p. 251; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
To conclude, empirical evidence has suggested that formal planning outperforms informal 
planning. Distinguishing between planning as a process and business plan as a formal output of 
this process is an important step forward in resolving the inconclusiveness surrounding the 
question of whether entrepreneurs should plan or not.  
2.1.3.2.4 Pre-­‐entry	  knowledge	  
Knowledge of business activity and management experience gained in the entrepreneur’s past 
were also found to moderate the planning performance relationship. According to Dencker, 
Gruber & Shah (2009, p. 531), such knowledge and experience has a positive impact on the 
effectiveness of planning for two reasons. First, founders with more knowledge and experience 
were said to be better at identifying relevant planning issues and processing information due to 
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their understanding of the industry. Second, because they are familiar with planning practices, 
they are more efficient at planning in general. Bhide (2000) paralleled this view and highlighted 
that previous experience leads to more accurate planning, which in turn leads to better 
performance. 
Burke et al. (2010, p. 401) rejected these claims with their research in which they stated that pre-
entry knowledge had a negative moderating effect on the planning performance link. Their 
sample suggested that “unemployed entrepreneurs are more likely to write business plans”, which 
led the authors to the conclusion that “low human capital individuals derive greater benefits from 
writing business plans”. It should be noted that the latter statement is merely a conclusion and 
not tested against empirical data. 
Further investigation of how pre-entry knowledge affects planning is expected to contribute to an 
understanding of entrepreneurial planning and whether and how it affects planning. 
2.1.3.2.5 The	  need	  for	  external	  finance	  
As outlined above, a written plan is often assumed to facilitate the acquisition of resources by 
providing “a screening function for financiers” (Burke et al., 2010, p. 395) and by legitimating 
the business to external people. Therefore, scholars have argued that if external finance is required 
for a new venture to succeed, engaging in planning should increase the likelihood of success. 
Surprisingly, contrasting empirical evidence revealed that the actual content of business plans 
does not inform the decisions made by U.S.-based venture capitalists. Hence in the U.S., 
business plans were said to “not play an important role in VC opportunity screening” (Kirsch, 
Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009, p. 510). This finding was paralleled by a Swedish qualitative, in-depth 
study which found that in the cases studied, “neither the bank nor the external capital provider 
seemed to use the business plan for deciding whether to finance the company or not” (Karlsson 
& Honig, 2009, p. 41). Hence, in contrast to Burke et al.’s (2010) findings, it was concluded 
that “writing a business plan was only marginally important for the resource acquisition of the 
studied firms” (Karlsson & Honig, 2009, p. 41). Given these conflicting views, further attention 
to the question of how the need for finance affects planning is required. 
2.1.3.2.6 Capital	  constraints	  
Lastly, Bhide (2000) noted that capital constraints moderate the planning performance 
relationship. Entrepreneurs with less capital struggle to afford “truly objective, statistically 
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significant data”. Hence, planning under capital constraints is said to be less accurate and 
therefore capital constraints are expected to have a negative moderating effect on the planning 
performance link. This negative effect is challenged by the argument that a formal business plan 
as an outcome of the planning process increases the likelihood of obtaining capital (see section 
2.1.3.2.3). Consequently, formal planning could actually help overcome capital constraints and 
lead to more accurate planning. The question of how entrepreneurs plan under capital 
constraints is certainly an interesting one and needs to be investigated in more detail. 
2.1.3.3 Implications	  of	  the	  theory	  reviewed	  for	  this	  study	  
The inconclusive results of studies testing the impact of planning on performance and the 
conflicting explanations developed as to why planning is good or bad validate the need for 
theory-building studies in this area. The methodology employed by such studies raises various 
interesting questions. For instance, instead of measuring planning in terms of having a written 
plan, do we need to develop a more nuanced understanding of planning? And, as another 
example, do we need to better distinguish between planning processes and the outcome of such 
processes? 
The moderators reviewed represent a quantitative approach to retrieve a more holistic 
understanding of entrepreneurial planning. However, such an approach is not suitable for 
providing “complete explanations of complex phenomenon such as strategy processes” 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006, p. 695). Nevertheless, as indicated in the individual 
sections, these moderators make interesting propositions and point to issues that upon further 
investigation are likely to result in an improved understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
2.1.4 Conclusion	  for	  academic	  fields	  concerned	  with	  entrepreneurial	  planning	  
This section presented academic fields and approaches that have contributed to an understanding 
of entrepreneurial planning. Academics have provided a delineation of the phenomenon of 
entrepreneurial planning, which have helped better understand what entrepreneurial planning is 
and how it can occur on multiple levels. The planning modes presented helped understand 
possible ‘logics’ in which planning processes unfold and raised the question of whether 
entrepreneurs can operate in several logics simultaneously. In addition, the inconclusive results of 
studies measuring the impact of planning on new venture performance pointed towards a need to 
establish a more nuanced understanding of planning and a better distinction of planning 
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processes and documents as outcomes of these planning processes. In addition, the moderators 
listed by authors of such studies highlighted important issues that are required to be investigated 
before further testing the effects of such moderators. 
The following section combines these insights from various fragmented streams of literature to 
produce a more holistic and theoretical understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
2.2 Developing	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  
Based on the theory reviewed above and other concepts, a theoretical framework was developed. 
This framework was not expected to explain planning in new ventures. Rather, it is the 
combination of important a priori constructs that revealed a vague and preliminary 
understanding of the phenomenon studied. Its purpose was to guide data collection and analysis. 
This data was then used to further develop the framework until a good fit between theory and 
empirical data was found. The following two sections discuss how the two parts of this 
theoretical framework were constructed. 
2.2.1 Processes	  of	  entrepreneurial	  planning	  
Strategic management research laid the very foundation of the first part of this framework – the 
processes of entrepreneurial planning summarised in Figure 9. Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst 
(2006), two strategic management scholars, developed comprehensive theory that explains the 
process of strategy making in established firms. The authors clearly separated antecedents, 
planners, planning issues, planning process and planning outcomes. The theoretical framework 
developed in this section builds on this theory and translates it to the entrepreneurial context. 
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Figure 9: A priori theoretical framework 
 
A further inspiration of the first part of this framework were the planning modes – the design 
mode, the entrepreneurial mode, the learning mode and the effectuation mode – listed in section 
2.1.2. Each mode promotes a particular view of what the planning process could look like. For 
instance, all modes except the learning mode implied that the entrepreneur is the key planner. 
This confirmed the importance of having the entrepreneur at the heart of the planning process. 
At the same time, the notion of decentralised planning that may occur once the venture grows, as 
suggested by proponents of the learning mode, was accounted for by studying decision making 
over time. Moreover, in some modes, reoccurring planning issues were specified and prescribed. 
The framework was designed to explore the fit between such theory and planning issues that 
arose in the cases studied. Of similar interest was the confrontation of process characteristics 
established in theory with empirical data from the cases. 
The three levels of planning – strategy making, business modelling and tactical planning – 
discussed in section 2.1.1 also informed this framework. Of particular interest when applying 
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these three levels of planning to the framework was the question of whether a distinction between 
strategy making and business modelling can be made in practice and if so, how the two concepts 
relate to each other. Data was also expected to reveal whether concepts from strategic 
management associated with strategy making could be transferred to the levels of business 
modelling as well as tactical planning. 
Life cycle literature and Churchill & Lewis’ (1983) classic article in particular provided further 
inspiration for antecedents such as size of team, systems and controls, and degree of delegation, 
all of which can be described as venture characteristics. 
Lastly, the framework was inspired by the moderators listed in section 2.1.3.2: environmental 
dynamism, formal output, newness of the firm, pre-entry knowledge, the need for external 
finance and capital constraints. Although no relationships or moderating effects were measured, 
this thesis was driven by a desire to understand how and why certain factors affect planning. The 
following explains how these moderators were translated into the framework. First, those 
dimensions of environmental dynamism relevant to the context of new ventures were included as 
antecedents. Second, the moderator of formal output inspired to explore the outcome 
characteristics of the planning process. Third, the moderator of newness was also accounted for. 
In the literature, newness has been used to distinguish between new and established small firms. 
This research ‘controls’ for new ventures but the concept of time was relevant nevertheless. 
Planning was studied as a dynamic construct and therefore explored over a period of time divided 
into ‘stages’, which should allow for cross-case comparison. Fourth, the moderator of pre-entry 
knowledge was added as a characteristic of the entrepreneur. Lastly, the need for external finance 
and capital constraints were one of several venture characteristics expected to shape the planning 
process as an antecedent. 
2.2.2 Planning	  archetypes	  of	  new	  ventures	  
These moderators also inspired to create archetypes of new ventures. Quantitative researchers 
have used moderators to account for different contexts in which planning unfolds. As outlined in 
section 2.1.3.2, the introduction of such moderators has done little in resolving the 
inconclusiveness of studies measuring the planning performance relationship. This does not 
surprise given that moderators cannot compensate for very diverse samples. According to Miller 
(2011), “combining apples and oranges and running linear models would still obscure reality if 
one did not know exactly which (of many) potential moderators mattered” (p. 885). Instead, “it 
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is useful to distinguish among different types of organizations, to describe each type richly in 
order to have a sufficiently fine-grained understanding of context, and then to look at 
relationships among the variables within types” (pp. 885-886). Quantitative researchers have 
termed this the ‘configurational approach’ (D. Miller & Friesen, 1984). Hutzschenreuter & 
Kleindienst (2006), who did a very comprehensive review on strategy process research in the 
context of strategic management, confirmed the usefulness of such an approach. In particular, 
they found that “the benefit of configurational research may be seen in its potential to offer more 
useful and complete explanations of complex phenomenon such as strategy processes”. In 
addition, they expressed that they “anticipate future work to rely more heavily on configurational 
theory and research than that provided by simple bivariate descriptions” (p. 695). Empirical 
evidence has shown that a ‘configurational approach’ is particularly suitable when studying 
entrepreneurial strategy making (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997, p. 677).  
Therefore, this section seeks to leverage the knowledge that led to these moderators and use 
archetypes instead of moderators to account for different contexts of entrepreneurial planning. 
By creating combinations of all moderators reviewed in this research, one could establish dozens 
of archetypes of new ventures. Nevertheless, when establishing archetypes, there is always a trade-
off between the number of archetypes and practicability. Therefore, in this thesis, only the most 
important moderators inform the development of archetypes. Appendix C lists three moderators 
that were mentioned by more than one study: environmental uncertainty, newness of the firm 
and the need for finance. The following reviews whether and how these moderators are suitable 
dimensions in the task of establishing archetypes. 
Environmental uncertainty or state uncertainty, as described in section 2.1.3.2.1, is the 
moderator most often mentioned. It is often measured in terms of innovativeness of the new 
venture because the introduction of novelty is the major cause for uncertainty in this context and 
innovativeness is something that can easily be measured. Such innovativeness is usually associated 
with a novel product or service. However, as business model innovation literature suggests, 
innovation can also occur in other aspects of the business model such as the profit formula, the 
key resources or the key processes (Christensen, 1997). Hence, the dichotomy of executing a 
proven and existing business model versus introducing a new business model, which may or may 
not include a new product or service, was used here to establish archetypes. 
The second most widely used moderator is newness of the firm. This might surprise given that 
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Appendix C – as a reflection of the context of this thesis – only lists studies that focused entirely 
on new ventures and therefore ‘controlled’ for newness. Nevertheless, some scholars have 
acknowledged that planning is a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon. The moderator of 
newness was an attempt to reflect this relationship between time and planning. The methodology 
of this thesis allowed for a much deeper understanding of how time and planning are related. By 
implementing a time axis into the theoretical framework depicted in Figure 9, close attention was 
paid to how and why planning evolves and how such development affects the venture and 
subsequent planning. From this point of view and when taking into consideration that this thesis 
only looks at new ventures, it would make little sense to create archetypes based on time. 
Consequently, the moderator of newness did not inform the archetypes developed here. 
Lastly, the need for finance was mentioned by some studies. As outlined in section 2.1.3.2.5, 
formal plans are often used to communicate a business model and establish legitimacy. 
Therefore, the need for finance is very likely to impose certain planning requirements on the 
entrepreneur. Hence, the need for external finance also informed the archetypes established. 
Figure 10: Archetypes of planning in new ventures 
 
Figure 10 shows the four archetypes established based on the two dimensions mentioned. It is 
assumed that planning unfolds in very different ways for each of these archetypes. Consequently, 
these archetypes were used to select the cases of this study. 
proven	  business	  model	  /	  0inance	  
new	  business	  model	  /	  0inance	  
proven	  business	  model	  /	  no	  0inance	  
new	  business	  model	  /	  no	  0inance	  
finance	  needed	  
no	  finance	  needed	  
new	  business	  model	  proven	  business	  model	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2.2.3 Summary	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  
By combining fragmented theories, a holistic framework shown in Figure 9 was developed to 
guide this research. Whereas the archetypes developed were used to select cases, the suggested 
antecedents, issues, sequences of actions and outcomes of entrepreneurial planning as well as the 
role of characteristics of entrepreneurs in the planning process informed the research questions 
and underpinned data collection as well as analysis. 
2.3 Conclusion	  to	  the	  literature	  review	  
Entrepreneurial planning has been researched for decades. Narrow streams of literature studying 
such planning from different angles have provided important insights into entrepreneurial 
planning. Therefore, it made sense to review these findings and combine them into one holistic 
framework. However, most of the a priori constructs informing this framework are either of 
conceptual nature or studies testing these constructs have been inconclusive. Therefore, the 
theory generated in this research needs to be confronted with empirical data. Such confrontation 
is expected to enrich theory and provide a more accurate picture of how entrepreneurial planning 
unfolds. The following section discusses the methodology used to confront the theory developed 
in this chapter with data from the real world. 
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3 METHODOLOGY	  
Chapter 2 combined constructs from previous literature to produce a framework that explains 
entrepreneurial planning in theory. This theory by itself is incomplete and needs to be refined by 
confronting it with data from the real world. The methodology appropriate for this process is 
presented in this chapter. 
As shown in Figure 11, this chapter can be divided into five parts that inform one another. The 
first part outlines why constructionism is the epistemological stance aligning best with the 
purpose of this research. Hermeneutics as the suitable methodological perspective for the task of 
confronting theory with data is outlined in the second part. The third part explains why 
qualitative research is the appropriate design in this theory-building study. How case research as 
the chosen research strategy allows for a holistic understanding of the phenomenon studied is 
discussed in the fourth part. Lastly, the fifth part provides a detailed examination of the methods 
used. 
Figure 11: Approach to research 
 
Methods:	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  /	  documents	  /	  digital	  records	  
Research	  strategy:	  case	  research	  
Research	  design:	  qualitaXve	  research	  
Methodological	  perspecXve:	  hermeneuXcs	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
interpreXvism	  
Epistemology:	  construcXonism	  
Section	  3.1 
Section	  3.2 
Section	  3.3 
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3.1 Epistemological	  stance	  and	  methodological	  perspective	  
As highlighted in section 2.1.3, most empirical research studying entrepreneurial planning has 
been conducted from an objectivist stance and a positivist perspective. Despite three decades of 
such research, results have been very inconclusive. To overcome this inconclusiveness, the first 
section reviews various epistemological stances and explains why constructivism is the 
appropriate epistemology to advance our understanding of entrepreneurial planning. In a similar 
vein, the second section introduces hermeneutics as the methodological perspective suitable for 
confronting the theory developed in Chapter 2 with data. 
3.1.1 Constructionism	  as	  the	  epistemological	  stance	  
As shown in Figure 12, in social sciences, the epistemological assumptions can be considered 
along a continuum between objectivist and subjectivist approaches (Jaspers, 1956; Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980, p. 492). The following three sections introduce the basic concepts that underpin 
the two opposites and the middle of this spectrum. The last section reviews these stances in view 
of the purpose of this research and outlines how a constructionist stance can contribute to an 
improved understanding of entrepreneurial planning. 
Figure 12: The subjectivist objectivist continuum 
 
Note. Adapted from Morgan & Smircich (1980, p. 492) 
3.1.1.1 Objectivism	  
An objectivist epistemological stance, which assumes that reality “exists in objects independently 
of any consciousness”, is often informed by the “ontological notion asserting that realities exist 
outside the mind” (Crotty, 1998, p. 8). Consequently, the objectivist stance maintains that the 
world consists of objects that carry their context-free meaning intrinsically and humans merely 
discover this meaning (Crotty, 1998; Seymour, 2006). Because knowledge and the truth are to 
be found in objects and not in the human mind, objectivist researchers prioritise the study of 
Objectivism:	  
reality	  as	  a	  concrete	  
structure	  
Subjectivism:	  
reality	  as	  a	  projection	  of	  
human	  imagination	  
Constructionism:	  
reality	  as	  a	  social	  
construction	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attributes of such objects and see the social world as a “hard, external, objective reality” (Burrell 
& Morgan, 1979, p. 3). 
For instance, objectivist researchers could be interested in studying a business plan by analysing 
the number of pages, the table of contents, the role of the author, the date the plan was produced 
and whether the new venture had received funding. These are all hard facts and whoever 
measures these facts will produce the same results. In other words, there is a “‘real’ reality” (Guba 
& Lincoln, 2005, p. 193) out there and the researcher discovers “how things really are […] [and] 
how things really work” (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). 
As a result, the researcher is detached from reality. The rhetoric of such research is formal and the 
voice of the researcher is a “voice from nowhere” reporting facts (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 
209). Because the researcher is merely reporting facts, his or her contribution is expected to be 
unbiased (Crotty, 1998). Quality criteria are rigour, internal and external validity, reliability and 
objectivity (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). 
3.1.1.2 Subjectivism	  
On the other side of the continuum are subjectivist researchers. Interestingly enough, a 
subjectivist epistemological stance does not necessarily reject the ontological assumptions of 
objectivist researchers (Crotty, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Most researchers do not challenge 
the notion that things existed outside the human mind before the evolution of human species. 
However, they ask what kind of world there was before conscious beings engaged with it. Many 
will argue that an intelligible world of meaning only arises when meaning-making beings make 
sense of it (Crotty, 1998). 
Subjectivist researchers are interested in understanding how individuals create, modify and 
interpret meaning (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Perren & Grant, 2002). Therefore, they prioritise 
the subject over the object, by focusing, for example, on consciousness, experience, ego, self and 
psyche (Seymour, 2006). It is the subject that imposes meaning on the object (Crotty, 1998) and 
reality is a projection of human imagination (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). There are no objects 
with intrinsic meaning, we cannot know things as they really are in themselves. Without 
consciousness or the human mind, no meaning would exist. 
Researchers of this stance study what our synthesising cognition makes of the things (Seymour, 
2006). They acknowledge that they themselves impose meaning on that being studied and bring 
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their own bias to the research. Hence, subjectivist researchers express both their own voice and 
the voice of their participants in their research. Because there is neither an objective truth to be 
uncovered nor generalisable results, the quality criteria shown in Appendix D are very different 
from those of objectivist research. 
3.1.1.3 Constructionism	  
In between the two ends of the subjectivist and dualist continuum lies constructionism. 
Constructionism is distinct from both the objectivist view in which reality exists independent of 
consciousness and to the subjectivist view in which reality is merely a projection of human 
imagination. Instead, “truth, or meaning, comes into existence in and out of our engagement 
with the realities in our world” (Crotty, 1998, p. 8). Individuals construct such meaning as they 
interact with one another and with objects. Hence, it is through action and interaction that we 
construct meaning locally and specifically, bound by context and time. Important here is the 
understanding that in this view “meaning is not discovered, but constructed […] [and] different 
people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 8). 
Hence, similar to subjectivism, in constructionism reality cannot exist without consciousness. At 
the same time, constructionist researchers take objects seriously. Even though these objects may 
not carry any intrinsic meaning, it is through the interaction with objects that we construct 
meaning. Therefore, objects shape meaning. As a result, constructionism brings together 
objectivism and subjectivism (Crotty, 1998). 
Because there is no objective reality, constructionism accounts for multiple ways of making sense 
of a phenomenon. The focus is on the interaction of human beings with objects and other 
human beings. As a result, the voice of the researcher is that of “a facilitator of multivoice 
reconstruction” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 196). The view on bias and the approach to establish 
trustworthy research are similar to subjectivism. 
3.1.1.4 Review	  of	  the	  epistemological	  stances	  in	  the	  light	  of	  this	  research	  
For this research, to be seen in the context in which they arise neither a purely objectivist nor a 
purely subjectivist stance is appropriate. An objectivist stance conflicts with the purpose of this 
research for various reasons. 
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First, this thesis is concerned with how entrepreneurs take an idea, form it into an opportunity 
and engage in planning to build a viable business around this opportunity. This is in contrast 
with an objectivist perspective, which assumes that opportunities pre-exist in the world 
independently of anyone and entrepreneurs merely discover and exploit them. Rather, it is 
assumed in this thesis that “opportunities are made, not found” (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 
2003, p. 113) and that entrepreneurs ‘fabricate’ opportunities from the realities of their life and 
value systems (Sarasvathy, 2009, p. xiii). This process is not following a clear or identifiable path 
to solution (Styles & Seymour, 2006, p. 131) and therefore challenges objectivist assumptions as 
to how planning occurs. 
Second, this research seeks to understand the planning that occurs when entrepreneurs introduce 
novelty to a market. “All innovation begins with creative ideas” (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, 
& Herron, 1996, p. 1154) and producing creative ideas is a heuristic rather than an algorithmic 
process (Amabile, 1996). The concepts of intuition, creativity and novelty are not accounted for 
in the objectivist worldview consisting of “patterns of observations […] [and] classifications of 
kinds and classes of previously known observable events” (Seymour, 2006, p. 141). Therefore, 
“novelty cannot be understood within a lawful framework” (Seymour, 2006, p. 141). 
Lastly, ignoring the subject and focusing on objects such as formal plans reveals little about 
planning because planning is a social phenomenon. Nevertheless, even if we were only interested 
in plans, in order to understand a plan we would need to know the context in which these plans 
arise. Similarly, objectifying the subject, the planning entrepreneur, as seen in the ‘trait approach’ 
(Gartner, 1988) is unlikely to shed light on the black box of entrepreneurial planning as a process 
involving social action. Instead, “subjective data are necessary when the primary focus of research 
is the intentions of entrepreneurs” (Smith, Gannon, & Sapienza, 1989, p. 46). 
In a similar vein but for fewer reasons, a purely subjectivist stance is not ideal either. First, some 
objective attributes of planning artefacts are relevant to this research and therefore should not be 
ignored. Second, the subjectivist conceptualisation does little to explore the critical social aspects 
of planning (Carsrud & Krueger, 1995; Seymour, 2006). This is not to say that subjective 
perceptions of individuals should be ignored in this thesis but rather that these perceptions need 
to be seen in the context in which they arise, including the interactions individuals have. 
Consequently, much better suited is a constructionist stance. The epistemological assumptions 
underpinning this perspective are aligned with the goal of the thesis. For instance, a 
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constructionist approach allows us to see planning as a phenomenon “contingent upon human 
practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, 
and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (Crotty, 1998, p. 42). Such 
an approach is expected to reveal why entrepreneurs plan a certain way with particular attention 
to certain antecedents listed in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. In addition, by 
taking into consideration both the subject and the object, we can study the entrepreneur as the 
planner and formal artefacts as outcomes of the planning process. 
3.1.2 Methodological	  perspective:	  hermeneutics	  as	  a	  form	  of	  interpretivism	  
Most constructionist studies draw on interpretivism. The first section explains why this research 
is no different. The second section discusses how interpretivism can be divided into several 
disciplines and why, amongst these options, hermeneutics is the methodological perspective that 
aligns best with this research. 
3.1.2.1 Interpretivism	  as	  a	  mean	  to	  explain	  human	  and	  social	  reality	  
Most business research is informed by positivism, a theoretical perspective rooted in objectivism. 
As outlined in section 2.1.3, a positivist stance has also underpinned many studies examining 
entrepreneurial planning. Whereas such positivist science is concerned with gathering empirical 
data through direct experience to measure the given, interpretivism “emerged in 
contradistinction to positivism in attempts to understand and explain human and social reality” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 66). It was conceived in the belief that humans cannot be studied using a 
positivist approach. The idea of a value-free, detached observer measuring empirical regularities 
and universal features of societies with quantitative methods was rejected. Instead, proponents of 
the interpretivist approach argued that in order to understand individuals and societies, we need 
to look for “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 67). Such an approach allows for deep insight into “the complex world of lived 
experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Schwandt, 1994, p. 118) and is very 
compatible with constructionism. The interpreting researcher “documents the [participant’s] 
point of view and translates it into a form that is intelligible to readers” (Neuman, 1997, p. 72). 
Hence, he or she acts as a vehicle by which meaning is created (Andrade, 2009; Cavana, 
Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001). It is through quality arguments rather than through statistical 
precision that the interpretivist researcher comes to conclusions (Andrade, 2009). Because 
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interpretivists interpret and are subject to their bias, “no construction is or can be 
incontrovertibly right” and researchers “must rely on persuasiveness and utility rather than proof 
in arguing position” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). 
3.1.2.2 Hermeneutics	  as	  the	  chosen	  form	  of	  interpreting	  
This interpretivist approach has appeared historically in many guises. Crotty (1998) lists the 
three main streams: symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics. This thesis 
applies a hermeneutical perspective. The term hermeneutics became popular in the seventeenth 
century when it represented guidelines for scholars in the practice of exegesis, the interpretation 
of biblical and other sacred texts. It was recognised that in order to understand extracts of such 
texts, both the context in which these words were written and the text as a whole needed to be 
considered when analysing passages. Later, hermeneutics was extended to other sources that were 
based on language, such as human actions including interviews, conversations, events and 
situations. This extension was made in the belief that language shapes the situations we find 
ourselves in, the events that affect us and the actions we carry out (Arnold & Fischer, 1994; 
Thompson, Pollio, & Locander, 1994). Because the researcher and the informant are embedded 
in a cultural background, they can interchange meaning through language, “the universal 
medium in which understanding occurs” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 389). 
A hermeneutical approach matches the type of sources that are most likely to reveal insights: 
written documents such as formal plans, interviews and digital records documenting the growing 
ventures. In addition, the hermeneutical cycle shown in Figure 13 is most suitable for the task of 
confronting the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 with empirical data. This 
approach allows theory to be refined by matching it with data in an iterative process until a good 
fit is found. Such creating of meaning occurs on two dimensions (Thompson et al., 1994). First, 
interpretation and reinterpretation is conducted by moving back and forth between small parts of 
a source and the whole understanding of the phenomenon developed. Specific elements are to be 
revisited and reinterpreted as this understanding progresses. Second, the interpreter uses a priori 
constructs such as the theoretical framework developed and his or her preconceptions to 
understand the source. Therefore, other than in positivist research, the researcher serves as an 
instrument (McCracken, 1988) and prejudice is seen as a necessity in developing understanding 
and connecting to that being interpreted. This initial understanding is often referred to as the 
researcher’s horizon. As researchers develop their (pre-)understanding, their horizon moves closer 
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to the discerned horizon of the source that is being interpreted until researchers are fully capable 
of accounting for the sense of the source. When this ‘fusion of horizons’ occurs, the interpreter 
integrates or even encompasses the discerned horizon of the source. 
Figure 13: The hermeneutical cycle and the fusion of horizons 
 
Note. Adapted from Thompson et al. (1994, p. 434) 
3.2 Research	  design,	  research	  strategy	  and	  trustworthiness	  
Whereas the previous section discussed the philosophical underpinnings of this research, this 
section is concerned with the scientific principles underlying the organisation of the inquiry of 
this research. The following three sections discuss different aspects that need to be addressed. The 
first section explains why qualitative research is the appropriate design in this theory-building 
study. How case research as the chosen research strategy allows for a holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon studied is discussed in the second section. Lastly, the third section outlines the 
measures taken to ensure that this thesis is worthy of trust. 
3.2.1 Qualitative	  research	  as	  the	  research	  design	  
Research designs can be considered along a continuum ranging from qualitative to quantitative 
approaches with mixed methods in the middle. Like all business research, entrepreneurship was 
originally dominated by strictly scientific research designs employing quantitative techniques to 
gather and analyse data. Recently, however, even popular, quantitative researchers have started to 
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see the benefits of qualitative research in this domain. Danny Miller (2011), the creator of the 
construct of entrepreneurial orientation, which has been used in many quantitative studies to 
measure entrepreneurship, explains: “entrepreneurship is a complex process defined in part by 
context and purpose and conditioned by many factors […] [and] it is therefore best studied up 
close, at least some of the time”. This is the case with this study. As outlined in section 2.1.3, 
quantitative researchers have struggled to study planning with quantitative methods. Therefore, 
before further testing vague theories with such methods, theory in the form of a better 
understanding of entrepreneurial planning needs to be built. 
Qualitative research is the preferred mode of such theory building because it often employs open-
ended questions, which facilitate understanding. In addition, a qualitative design is likely to “lead 
to serendipitous findings” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 1) or “unanticipated events” (Gephart 
& Rynes, 2004, p. 455), which “help researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and to 
generate or revise conceptual frameworks” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 1) by iterating through 
the hermeneutic circle depicted in Figure 13. More specifically, a qualitative approach suits the 
purpose of this research, which is to understand how planning in entrepreneurial new ventures 
unfolds in reality. Such an approach allows to focus “on naturally occurring, ordinary events in 
natural settings, so that we have a strong handle on what ‘real life’ is like” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 10). This understanding is enabled by collecting, analysing and representing data in the 
form of words rather than numbers (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Words provide thick and rich 
descriptions, which allow for a holistic and personal understanding (Stake, 2010). In addition, 
“with qualitative data one can preserve chronological flow, see precisely which events led to 
which consequences, and derive fruitful explanations” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 1) due to 
an “emphasis on situational details unfolding over time” (Gephart & Rynes, 2004, p. 455). This 
data is expected to reveal how entrepreneurs plan differently at different stages as they develop 
their idea and build a viable business around it. 
Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst (2006, p. 698ff), two strategic management scholars who 
provided a most comprehensive review of literature on strategy process research, echoed this. 
They concluded the following: 
From a methodological point of view, these concepts [explaining strategy process] 
require longitudinal research, action science, sequence modeling, ethnographic 
approach, and case histories […]. In this regard, the reductionist approach of testing 
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hypotheses, commonly used in linkage-exploring studies, however, is not suitable. 
The exploration of complex systems such as organizations or strategy processes 
unfolding within an organizational context as a whole cannot be studied using linear 
or approximated linear systems. For such systems, it is extremely difficult to find the 
specific causes of specific effects. Hence, instead of looking for causes and effects, it is 
necessary to look for patterns and their systematic implications. Thus, we assume 
future research should conduct further field studies in different settings to validate 
the models presented. 
Qualitative research also reflects the epistemological stance of this thesis because “qualitative 
researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 10). 
Whereas “quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal relationships 
between variables”, qualitative research can provide “answers to questions that stress how social 
experience is created and given meaning” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 10). Such research is also 
compatible with the theoretical perspective of this thesis as it “involves an interpretive [...] 
approach to the world” designed “to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). 
3.2.2 Case	  research	  as	  the	  research	  strategy	  
Qualitative research can be conducted in many ways, and case research is one of them. Whereas 
qualitative research refers to the overall design of the research, case research is the research 
strategy chosen. More precisely, in this research, a case study is defined as “a research strategy 
that examines, through the use of a variety of data sources, a phenomenon in its naturalistic 
context, with the purpose of ‘confronting’ theory with the empirical world” (Piekkari, Welch, & 
Paavilainen, 2009, p. 569). The most important part of this definition is the naturalistic and 
holistic strategy of enquiry, as opposed to a laboratory approach (Piekkari et al., 2009). 
Such research aligns well with the purpose of this research. According to Pettigrew (1997, p. 
338ff), case research enables the study of “a sequence of individual and collective events, actions, 
and activities unfolding over time in context” and “thereby is able to describe and account for 
how some entity or issue develops and changes over time” as well as how such sequences link to 
outcomes. Moreover, the case approach as a research strategy is particularly relevant in the 
context of new ventures, in which it is important to understand behaviours of entrepreneurs 
(Ireland, Reutzel, & Webb, 2005; Partanen, Miller, Westerlund, Rajala, & Rajala, 2008). 
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Strategic management scholars who reviewed the majority of studies on strategy process confirm 
that case research is suitable for collecting data on strategy processes (Hutzschenreuter & 
Kleindienst, 2006). 
3.2.2.1 Various	  forms	  of	  case	  research	  and	  their	  epistemological	  underpinnings	  
Because case research can come in a variety of definitions and forms, it is necessary to further 
clarify the particular approach taken in this study. Preferences for particular approaches depend 
on the discipline, time period, context of the research, philosophical underpinnings and the 
scope and purpose of the research (Piekkari et al., 2009). Most entrepreneurship case research is 
located on the objectivist end of the subjectivist objectivist continuum (Grant & Perren, 2002) 
shown in Figure 13. The main authority on objectivist case research is Yin (2009). Known for his 
scientific approach, he uses case studies to deductively test theory. Consequently, he has a 
preference for a rigorous, predefined design of the study (Piekkari et al., 2009). Access to 
personal meanings and richness of data are not his focus (Platt, 1992). Generalisability is 
achieved through multiple experiments known as replication logic. Eisenhardt (2002), the other 
objectivist authority, builds on Yin but has a slightly different approach. Eisenhardt sees case 
research as the theory-building part in the theory-building and theory-testing circle depicted in 
Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Theory-building and theory-testing circle 
 
Therefore, in her view, case studies act as a bridge “from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream 
deductive research” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Correspondingly, Eisenhardt 
acknowledges the importance of a partially emergent design. This is in sharp contrast with Yin’s 
deep wide 
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approach. He (2009) clearly states that if the research shifts, “you should simply start over again, 
with a new design” (p. 52) because “the main purpose of the design is to help avoid the situation 
in which the evidence does not address the initial research questions” (p. 27). Despite this 
embrace of emergent designs, Eisenhardt’s approach is far from subjectivist case research because 
according to her, “well-done theory building from cases is surprisingly ‘objective,’” and “the data 
provide the discipline that mathematics does in formal analytic modeling” (p. 25). Subjectivist 
case researchers, on the other hand, label Eisenhardt’s attempt to generate theory with objectivist 
means as paradoxical. These critics claim that data from such ‘hybrid’ research data will “be 
rather ‘thin,’ focusing on surface data rather than deeper social dynamics” and miss the context. 
Instead, subjectivist researchers promote holistic, single case studies with rich and thick data that 
tell good stories rather than create constructs (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991, pp. 613-615). In addition, 
it is argued that multiple case studies based on the above mentioned replication logic are not even 
suited for theory testing because the sample size does not allow for generalisation. 
3.2.2.2 Constructionist	  case	  research	  
The approach to case research taken in this thesis is between the two extremes of the subjectivist 
objectivist continuum. In line with the philosophical underpinnings, the theoretical perspective 
and the research design, this approach is inspired by Stake (2005), a constructionist and 
interpretivist case researcher. He dismisses neither single case studies nor multiple case studies. 
However, in his view, multiple case studies, or collective case studies as he terms it, are not 
undertaken to achieve generalisability but rather to obtain “better understanding, and perhaps 
better theorizing” in specific research settings (p. 446). He explicitly reminds the researcher that 
whereas balance and variety are important things to consider, the “opportunity to learn is often 
more important” and therefore single case studies are by no means inferior to multiple case 
studies (p. 446). Stake pays particular attention to context and urges researchers to place their 
‘ever-reflective’, interpreting intellect “into the thick of what is going on” (p. 449). 
A constructionist case study has a few features worth discussing here. First, it consists of several 
components and the researcher needs to make a decision as to which of these components he or 
she wants to study. Certain components lie within the boundaries of the case whereas others lie 
outside. Conducting research inside the boundaries can reveal activities such as the approach to 
planning taken by entrepreneurs. Because situation often shapes activity, it is also important to 
look at elements outside the boundaries to understand the context in which action arises. This 
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can, for instance, reveal antecedents of entrepreneurial planning. A visual representation of each 
case and its boundaries as well as its context is provided in section 3.3.2. Second, when writing 
up a multiple case study, the researcher faces a trade-off between theory and empirical richness. 
Researchers on the objectivist side such as Eisenhardt (2007, p. 29) recommend that “the 
overarching frame of the paper is the theory, and each part of the theory is demonstrated by 
evidence from at least some of the cases”. In a constructionist study, thick and rich descriptions 
are favoured instead. This is accomplished by “articulating a theorized story line, or a particular 
kind of plot that relates the field and academic worlds” (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007, p. 26). 
Third, a constructionist case researcher quotes participants to illustrate a point they make, to 
demonstrate the difference and similarity in views, to provide the language of participants and to 
show how these participants make sense of the world (Corden & Sainsbury, 2006). Fourth, the 
writer has to choose whether to use active or passive voice. Given that revealing the researcher’s 
bias contributes to good qualitative research, it makes sense to use active voice throughout the 
subsequent chapters. Fifth, through a close interaction with that being studied, the researcher 
becomes a ‘passionate participant’ (Andrade, 2009; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Whereas positivist 
scientists see the inclusion of the researcher’s bias as flawed, interpretivists appreciate such 
involvement because it provides an opportunity to get deep insights and the sort of 
understanding constructionist researchers are seeking. Lastly, Stake (2006) mentions three 
criteria that define a good case selection: (i) a selection of cases relevant to the phenomenon 
studied, (ii) a selection of cases providing diversity across contexts and (iii) a selection of cases 
allowing for learning about complexity and context. Section 3.3.2 addresses how these criteria 
were met in this research. 
3.2.2.3 Systematic	  combining:	  a	  framework	  for	  case	  research	  
Dubois & Gadde (2002) provided a framework for case research that aligns with the 
methodology outlined in this chapter. 
The framework of ‘systematic combining’ is based on the concept of abduction as opposed to 
induction or deduction. Abduction is a term coined by Charles Peirce, who argued that 
“discovery rests primarily on abductive reasoning” (Van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 
1149). Other than in grounded theory, a researcher with an abductive approach does not start his 
or her study with data. Instead, existing theory is taken and refined in “a continuous movement 
between an empirical world and a model world” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p. 554). This 
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movement is guided by an intertwined as opposed to a linear process and informed by the belief 
that “theory cannot be understood without empirical observation and vice versa” (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002, p. 555). As shown in Figure 15, two processes guide research that is informed by 
this concept: matching theory and reality as well as direction and redirection. 
Figure 15: Systematic combining as an abductive approach to case research 
 
Note. Reprinted from Dubois & Gadde (2002, p. 555) 
Matching theory and reality is the process of going backwards and forwards between theoretical 
framework, data sources and data analysis. All research, even grounded theory, starts with some 
theory we consciously or unconsciously carry with us. Dubois & Gadde encourage researchers to 
explicitly develop theory and a framework before collecting data. As the researchers learn from 
the data they collect, they then return to these a priori constructs to refine them. The refined 
concepts inform future data collection and so forth. This is in line with the core idea of iterating 
through the hermeneutical circle to develop understanding. 
Of equal importance in developing this understanding is the second process, the directing and 
redirecting. As the researcher gains insights, he or she might discover new dimensions of the 
research problem. This can inspire the researcher to alter the theoretical framework, the 
methodology and the case selection. Contrary to some people’s expectations, all these three 
elements are neither loose nor completely emergent. Rather, they are pre-structured and evolving. 
This idea of evolving theory and methodology is in contrast to the traditional structure of articles 
and theses. In this structure, theory, methods, data and findings are kept separate and isolated 
from one another, which reflects the linear process of theory testing. Although the number of 
alternative designs in journals is increasing, authors of such studies often still follow the 
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traditional structure when writing up their research because it is such well-established practice. 
This thesis is no different. Nevertheless, there are a few things that can be done to account for the 
abductive approach taken here (Dubois, 2007). For instance, the casing process and how the 
researcher’s understanding of the case evolved are made explicit. Moreover, the reasons for 
redirecting the thesis and how it affected subsequent decisions are mentioned. Lastly, 
reinterpretations that took place in the course of the research are revealed to the reader. 
3.2.3 Establishing	  trustworthiness	  in	  this	  study	  
Trustworthiness is the measure of the quality of research and therefore an important issue to 
discuss. For those readers interested in detailed information, Appendix D highlights how 
trustworthiness can be measured in qualitative research. Building on this, Appendix E outlines 
means to establish such trustworthiness. The remainder of this section focuses on the specific 
measures taken in this research to ensure that this thesis is worthy of trust. Equally important, 
measures outside the scope of this research that cannot be met are also discussed. Each of the 
following paragraphs corresponds to one criterion listed in the second column of Table 2. 
Table 2: Measures taken to achieve trustworthiness in this research 
Interpretivist	  criterion	  
Miles	  &	  Huberman	  (1994,	  p.	  277ff)	  
Measures	  taken	  or	  not	  taken	  
Authenticity:	  
“Do	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  make	  sense?	  Are	  they	  credible	  to	  the	  
people	  we	  study	  and	  to	  our	  readers?	  Do	  we	  have	  an	  authentic	  portrait	  of	  
what	  we	  were	  looking	  at?”	  
(Prolonged	  engagement)	  
Persistent	  observation	  
Triangulation	  
Peer	  debriefing	  
Member	  checks	  
Discrepant	  information	  
Fittingness:	  
“Are	  they	  [the	  conclusions]	  transferable	  to	  other	  contexts?	  Do	  they	  ‘fit’"?	  
Thick	  descriptions	  
Purposive	  selecting	  
Dependability:	  
“The	  underlying	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  process	  of	  the	  study	  is	  
consistent,	  reasonably	  stable	  over	  time	  and	  across	  researchers	  and	  
methods.	  […}	  Have	  things	  been	  done	  with	  reasonable	  care?”	  
Dependability	  audit	  
Confirmability:	  
Intersubjective	  agreement	  
Confirmability	  audit	  
Clarify	  researcher’s	  bias	  
Application:	  
The	  potential	  of	  the	  study	  to	  do	  something	  
Produce	  actionable	  findings	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To address the first criterion of prolonged engagement, the time constraints of this thesis did not 
allow for spending extensive time in each of the ventures studied. One exception was the case of 
Spreets. I worked for Spreets as a part-time graphic and web design freelancer from June 2010, 
four months after launch, until I decided to include Spreets in this research in August 2011. 
Although I mostly worked from home, I received a deep understanding of the company and the 
issues that emerged as it grew. In addition, at the time of writing I had been involved in the 
entrepreneurial technology scene in Sydney for two years, which facilitated the sourcing of cases. 
Spending this amount of time around entrepreneurs made me understand how entrepreneurs 
‘tick’ and the planning approaches Internet startups favour. These and other observations 
equipped me with knowledge that helped develop theory when iterating through the 
hermeneutical cycle. 
Persistent observation or focusing on few issues and going deep were central to this research. The 
theoretical framework that underpins this research as well as the interview questions were 
designed to gather detailed insights into specific issues. The same applied to follow-up interviews 
or interviews with different informants within the same case. In such interviews, the focus was on 
very specific questions. 
The concepts of triangulation and ‘multiple lines of sight’ (Berg, 2004, p. 5) also informed the 
design of this thesis. Where possible, multiple informants were interviewed. In addition, for each 
case, different sources were collected and analysed. 
Peer debriefing, the process of having ‘disinterested peers’ looking at the truth value of the 
findings, was only partly conducted. Preliminary findings were presented at several annual 
progress reports in front of other scholars, who provided feedback. In addition, my supervisor, 
who cannot be considered a ‘disinterested peer’ in a narrow sense, gave comprehensive feedback 
on the conclusions drawn. 
Member checks were performed during interviews by probing as well as by feeding back 
statements and also after the interview by sending informants the write-up of their case and 
asking them to point out any inaccuracies. 
Where it made sense, negative or discrepant information running counter to the themes and 
revealing different perspectives was included in the data analysis and presentation. 
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Thick descriptions that illustrate the context in which action or behaviour arose were provided. 
In particular, cases were described in depth and informants were cited whenever the informant’s 
voice was expected to help the consumer of this thesis understand the issues at hand as well as the 
conclusions drawn. 
‘Purposive selecting’ was sought through careful selection of cases, participants and documents to 
ensure variety and a new understanding of the phenomenon studied. Section 3.3.2 discusses the 
topic of case selection in more detail. In addition, where possible, informants including co-
founders, investors and incubators were purposefully selected to obtain different perspectives. 
However, access to all informants that were expected to have interesting information was not 
possible in all cases. 
Several people contributed to a dependability audit. Professors and fellow postgraduate 
researchers of the same faculty gave great input every time I presented my thesis at the annual 
progress reports. In addition, I received feedback on the design of the thesis through informal 
talks and email exchanges with peers I met at the University of Sydney as well as at conferences. 
My supervisors also constantly reviewed this research. 
As mentioned in section 3.2.3, neutrality was not sought in this research. Therefore, a 
confirmability audit was not conducted. Instead, Appendix F clarifies the bias that, I as the 
researcher, bring to this study. This clarification goes beyond conformability or neutrality. It 
equips the consumer of this thesis with more context, which is expected to enhance the reader’s 
understanding when interpreting the findings. However, the full bias that I bring to this research 
cannot be provided for two reasons. First, researchers are not consciously aware of their full bias. 
Second, the space given only allows for a summary. 
This links to the last measure of achieving trustworthiness in this research, the creation of 
actionable findings. A detailed overview of the contribution of the findings is given in Chapter 6. 
3.3 Methods	  
This last section describes the procedures used in this thesis to gather and analyse data. It is 
divided into four sections. The first section is concerned with the how interview questions were 
developed before collecting data. Details about the collection of data are presented in the second 
section. The third section illustrates how this data was analysed. Lastly, data presentation is 
discussed in the fourth section. 
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3.3.1 Developing	  interview	  questions	  
As Wengraf (2001) described in his compendium on semi-structured depth interviewing, good 
planning is essential because the outcome of an interview can never be expected to be 
significantly better than the questions asked. The following addresses a few questions shown in 
Figure 16 that helped shape the interview questions. 
Figure 16: Preparing interview questions 
	  
Note. Adapted from Wengraf (2001, p. 157) 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the ultimate purpose of this research is to produce theory that, 
combined with efforts from other scholars, can be used to reduce the high failure rate of 
entrepreneurs. To build such theory, this thesis addressed the central research question of how 
entrepreneurial planning unfolds. To produce more specific research questions, a theoretical 
framework was developed in Chapter 2. As shown in Table 3, the research questions were aimed 
at understanding the individual parts of this framework. In the interviews, I encouraged 
participants to explain me how their venture developed over time and how they approached 
planning. I started with asking “How did you come up with this business idea?” and moved 
along time by asking “What happened next?”. The following interview questions were used to 
probe where necessary: 
Research	  
Purpose	  
Central	  Research	  
QuesXon	  
Research	  
QuesXons	  
Interview	  
QuesXons	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Table 3: Research questions and interview questions used for probing 
Research	  question:	  
Understanding…	  
Interview	  question	  
Antecedents	   What	  required/inspired	  you	  to	  do	  XYZ	  when	  planning?	  Who	  did	  you	  
talk	  to	  outside	  the	  company,	  what	  was	  discussed	  and	  how	  did	  these	  
conversations	  benefit	  you?	  
Characteristics	  of	  the	  
entrepreneur	  
Before	  becoming	  involved	  in	  this	  venture,	  how	  much	  did	  you	  know	  
about	  the	  industry	  and	  planning	  and	  how	  do	  you	  think	  this	  affected	  
your	  contribution	  to	  this	  business?	  
Planning	  issues	   What	  sort	  of	  issues	  kept	  you	  awake	  at	  night?	  
Sequences	  of	  actions	   How	  did	  you	  address	  this	  particular	  issue?	  
Outcomes	  of	  the	  planning	  process	   Did	  you	  produce	  any	  documents	  in	  this	  process?	  
 
3.3.2 Collecting	  data	  
Based on the archetypes developed in section 2.2.2, four Sydney-based cases (see Figure 17) and 
one pilot case were selected. The following four sections discuss the rationale behind case 
selection and how data was collected for each case. A more general description as to how 
interviews were conducted is provided in the last section. 
Figure 17: Archetypes of planning in new ventures 
	  
Harlem	  on	  
Central	  bar	  
Immortal	  
Outdoors	  
Spreets	  
renewable	  
energy	  
startup	  
self	  funded	  
externally	  funded	  
new	  business	  model	  proven	  business	  model	  
  58 
3.3.2.1.1 Case	  1:	  Harlem	  on	  Central	  Bar	  
The first case was Harlem on Central, a bar in a beach town suburb of Sydney. The two 
entrepreneurs who built the bar did not receive any investment. In addition, the business model 
of bars was well proven. The bar opened in November 2011, five months before I conducted the 
interviews. As shown in Figure 18, to study this case, I first collected various online documents 
that explained the business. I then interviewed one of the owners and five days later I conducted 
a follow-up interview with one of the managers. 
Figure 18: Data collection for Harlem on Central 
 
3.3.2.1.2 Case	  2:	  Immortal	  Outdoors	  
Immortal Outdoors is an innovative business taking guidebooks online. The business model was 
unproven and Shane, the founder, had no intention to receive investment: 
I'm really different to most people in the startup community and it still confuses me 
a little bit. But everyone's so focused on having their idea, and pitching their idea, 
and getting investors. It's like that's success. You've got to get an investor whereas 
I've come from this... I just make stuff and it makes me money, and then I leverage 
up. And I really like that. I'd much rather make a profitable business that works 
under its own steam than me to get investment. 
For this case I only conducted one interview. Before meeting up with Shane, I went on Google to 
learn more about Shane’s past and to get a better understanding of his business. During the 
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interview, Shane introduced me to the NEIS curriculum and allowed me to take pictures of 
various documents he was given by the lecturer. Moreover, he showed me other planning 
documents he used. These sources are summarised in Figure 19. 
Figure 19: Data collection for Immortal Outdoors 
 
3.3.2.1.3 Case	  3:	  Renewable	  energy	  startup	  
For the third case, a renewable energy startup with a novel business model, the co-founders chose 
to remain anonymous. In this startup, many years of research were needed to develop new 
technology. This resulted in several rounds of investment to pay for the high upfront costs. 
Before interviewing the first co-founder, I did some online research and collected a smaller 
number of documents explaining the business as well as the background of the co-founders. I 
then conducted an interview with the first co-founder. As I was writing up the case description, 
more questions emerged and I arranged an interview with the second co-founder to clarify these 
issues and to triangulate. During these interviews the co-founders shared two planning 
documents with me. All data sources are summarised in Figure 20. 
  60 
Figure 20: Data collection for renewable energy startup  
 
3.3.2.1.4 Case	  4:	  Spreets	  
Spreets, a collective buying platform, introduced an existing business model to the Australian and 
New Zealand market. The business received one round of investment shortly after launch. 
The data collected and fed into the hermeneutic circle came from various sources as shown in 
Figure 21. I conducted one interview with each of the two co-founders to get multiple 
perspectives and to triangulate. The observations I gathered as a contractor for Spreets helped me 
understand the issues discussed in the interview. Moreover, both co-founders showed me 
planning documents they used. Prior to the interviews, I collected all relevant data I could find 
on the Internet. Because the entrepreneurs exited with a $40 million deal in less than one year 
after launch, Spreets received a fair amount of attention from the media. The information 
gathered and published together with emails I received from my time working there as a 
subcontractor helped me develop a detailed timeline. In addition, I looked up people on 
LinkedIn.com to understand their background. Most interesting were the many videos I found of 
the co-founders speaking about how Spreets managed to become so successful. This already gave 
some indications as to how the entrepreneurs planned. 
I also collected data about Pollenizer, Spreets’ incubator. Before conducting this study, I was 
already exposed to the planning approach Pollenizer promotes. When Spreets was still operating 
out of Pollenizer’s office, I spent some time there in my past role as a contractor for Spreets. 
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Moreover, I attended a few talks given by key people at Pollenizer and I spoke to other 
entrepreneurs that were incubated by Pollenizer. When conducting this research, I found an 
interview with Mick Liubinskas, one of the two co-founders at Pollenizer, that summarised 
Pollenizer’s promoted planning mode very well. To get a second perspective, I interviewed the 
other co-founder Phil Morle, who was the person at Pollenizer most closely involved with 
Spreets. 
Additional data included a press release of Yahoo!7 in the form of a video. Unfortunately, 
Spreets’ investors were not available for an interview. The only relevant information I could find 
were two online documents outlining the investors’ backgrounds. 
Figure 21: Data collection for Spreets case 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Conducting	  interviews	  
The interviews and follow-up interviews lasted between 15 and 120 minutes, depending on the 
role of the person interviewed and the amount of data already collected for that particular case. 
Interviews were recorded and notes were taken during the interview. In the first few minutes I 
usually engaged in some informal talking to take the interviewees’ mind off the hectic day. Then 
questions more relevant to this research were asked. The first question was always a very broad 
and open-ended one such as “how did you come up with the idea of starting this business?” 
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Already in the first interview, I became aware of the power of not interrupting the interviewee. 
Not only did the things the interviewee said naturally in his or her flow of speak provide answers 
to questions I had not even asked but this technique also produced data for emergent themes. 
Once the interviewee stopped talking, I either started to probe or to ask questions that had not 
been answered. To ensure that I covered all issues, I brought a table with me that mapped stages 
and other a priori themes. As shown in Figure 22, this table included data that I collected prior 
to the interview either online or by interviewing others within that particular case. I used the 
empty boxes to tick off the issues discussed. When the interview came to an end, I made sure I 
did not turn off the voice recorder until leaving the building because as I heard from other 
researchers, it is not uncommon for the interviewee to express some interesting final thoughts 
after the official part of the interview. 
Figure 22: Table used for the first interview with Spreets 
 
3.3.3 Data	  analysis	  
Interview transcript and other documents were imported into NVivo. After importing, I started 
coding using a priori themes that were based on the framework developed in Chapter 2. More 
codes were added in search for correspondence and patters. As the codebook grew, it needed to 
be consistently maintained, which is fairly easy to accomplish with NVivo. In addition, while 
coding, I wrote up the case descriptions. As suggested by the hermeneutical cycle, each section I 
wrote I had to revisit many times to include new findings and to account for different 
perspectives from different informants. 
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3.3.4 Data	  presentation	  
Presenting data was harder than anticipated and I had to change the structure of each case 
description many times to make it read well. Each structure starts with an introduction to the 
venture, which helps the reader better understand what follows. The remainder is composed of a 
theorised time line. Time was divided into stages and each section is devoted to one stage. For 
each stage, more contextual information is provided in the first section. The other sections 
highlight observations related to the theoretical framework and observations of emergent nature. 
As suggested when addressing the issue of trustworthiness in section 3.2.3, the informants’ voice 
was included in the case description. Furthermore, wherever it made sense, visuals were used to 
facilitate the understanding of complex issues. 
3.4 Conclusions	  to	  the	  methodology	  
This chapter outlined the methodology appropriate for advancing our understanding of 
entrepreneurial planning. The constructionist epistemological stance chosen allows us to study 
entrepreneurs engaging in planning as subjects, outcomes of this planning process as objects and 
social contexts which may shape the planning process. To refine the theoretical framework 
presented in Chapter 2 with data from the real world, a hermeneutical approach was chosen. 
Hermeneutical research matches the type of sources – formal plans, other documents and 
interviews – that are most likely to reveal insights into the phenomenon studied. In addition, the 
hermeneutical circle is built to iterate between theory and data to develop theory until a good fit 
is found. With respect to the research strategy, qualitative case research was selected. This 
enabled the building of new theory and a holistic understanding of entrepreneurial planning by 
studying it in its natural setting. The last section presented how the selection of cases, as well as 
the collection and analysis of data, is grounded in theory and followed clear procedures. In 
addition, the section outlined the structure of the next chapter in which data is presented in the 
form of case descriptions. 
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4 FINDINGS	  FROM	  THE	  CASES	  STUDIED	  
This chapter embeds the reader within the rich context of the cases studied (see Figure 23) before 
analysis and findings are presented in the following chapter. Each case starts with a short 
description of the venture. The subsequent sections within that case represent periods of times or 
stages. For each stage, atheoretical descriptions of the relevant context as well as antecedents, 
processes and outcomes of entrepreneurial planning are described. 
As the reader will notice, not all cases were conducted with equal depth for various reasons. First, 
not all ventures had gone through the same amount of stages. In addition, the level of access to 
data varied from case to case. Lastly, some ventures required more planning than others, resulting 
in longer descriptions. For the sake of readability, the cases in this chapter are presented in order 
of complexity, starting with the shortest and least complex case. 
Figure 23: Selected cases 
	  
4.1 Case	  1:	  Self-­‐funded	  startup	  with	  proven	  business	  model	  
Harlem on Central is a bar in Manly, a beach town suburb of Sydney. It is run by Kieran Bailey 
and Adam Clark, two serial entrepreneurs in the hospitality industry. Manly and its surrounding 
suburbs maintain a strong mainstream pub culture, to which Harlem on Central with its unique 
theme somewhat runs counter. More precisely, it is a dark, sleek and elegant 1920s-style bar with 
Case	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externally	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new	  business	  model	  proven	  business	  model	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distinct furniture. The bar opened in November 2011, four months before I interviewed Kieran, 
one of the two owners, and Davide Zanardo, one of the managers. The following sections discuss 
the outcome of these interviews along three stages: nascent idea, actively pursuing idea and 
launching. A summary of planning issues, outcomes and external people involved across stages is 
provided in Figure 24. 
Figure 24: Harlem: Planning issues, outcomes and external people involved 
 
Note. For each planning issue, the first line represents the issue, the second line the outcome and 
the third line the external people involved. 
4.1.1 Nascent	  idea	  
4.1.1.1 Contextual	  information	  
The Harlem on Central bar in Manly was Kieran Bailey’s brainchild. Kieran grew up in 
Birmingham, England. At the age of 18, Kieran started his career as bartender. He worked in 
some of the better-known bars both in his hometown and in London. He then became Brand 
Development Manager for Campari, Diageo, Smirnoff and other brands. In 2006, Kieran moved 
to Australia. His initial plan was to find work as a Brand Development Manager. In the course of 
seeking work, he made some interesting observations about the differences between the industry 
in London and Australia: 
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Tried to continue the brand work while I recognised that Australia as a marketplace 
wasn't ready for the level of brand work […]. Everything was still very slow, very just 
driven by the big drinks companies. No kind of boutique approach to anything. It 
wasn't about style. It was more volume and quantity as opposed to style and 
substance. 
Therefore, Kieran skipped his initial plan and started to work as a manager of a venue in Manly 
called ‘Henry Afrikas’. While managing Henry Afrikas, he opened another, smaller bar, ‘Miss 
Marleys’, with his new business partner, Adam Clarke. In the process of opening this bar, the 
three owners of Henry Afrikas decided to go out of business in May 2010. Kieran and Adam 
took over Henry Afrikas and renamed it ‘Sugar Lounge’. While owning and managing two bars, 
the two business partners built up a relationship with a woman who owned the venue that later 
became Harlem on Central. The woman and her husband who owned the previous venue – 
‘Frankies Number’ – decided to sell the business. Kieran and Adam bought it and started their 
third bar, named Harlem on Central, in Manly. At the same time the two entrepreneurs opened 
a small restaurant next door. The following section elaborates in more detail how the process 
depicted in Figure 25 unfolded. 
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Figure 25: Harlem: Planning process at stage of nascent idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.1.1.2 Planning	  process	  
When working hard to establish Sugarlounge and Miss Marleys, Kieran and Adam had no plans 
to open another bar. However, when they found out that the owners of Frankies Number 
decided to go out of business, they saw an opportunity and took it. Because of their connections 
and their experience in starting new bars, Kieran and Adam knew that they could build another 
bar and make it profitable: 
In regards to legalities and licensing and that kind of thing, the reason why we've 
done business in Manly now in four occasions is because we know the system, we 
know the people, we understand the hurdles. 
Hence, without going into the depths of cognitive psychology and opportunity recognition 
processes, it can be said that industry knowledge and entrepreneurial experience had an impact 
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on the opportunity evaluation process. 
4.1.2 Actively	  pursuing	  idea	  
4.1.2.1 Contextual	  information	  
While managing the other venues, Kieran and Adam built the interior of the bar. Most of the 
work they did themselves and they often worked until three o’clock in the morning. The 
challenge was to build something distinctive with attention to detail and at the same time launch 
as soon as possible in order to have revenue coming in. The following section provides a more 
detailed report (see also Figure 26). 
Figure 26: Harlem: Antecedents and process at the stage of pursuing idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
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4.1.2.2 Antecedent	  and	  planning	  process	  
Business modelling was not required because of the owners’ past experience in setting up bars. 
Instead, Kieran and Adam first focused on creating a “concept” for the venue. This concept 
evolved around the design of the bar and the menu, which on a more abstract level could be 
referred to as the product. The knowledge Kieran gained working in the industry helped him in 
this process: 
Yeah, the thing with working for lots of numerous drinks companies in lots of nice 
bars everyday of your life, you see concepts, you see ideas, you see things you like so, 
you know, when I walk into a space, I've got concepts in my head and I think that 
this concept will work in this space, you know? […] I said to Adam what about 
Harlem? And he was like yeah, because about twelve months ago prior to that, we 
discussed about a concept called Harlem, of kind of modern American dude food if 
you like […] bourbon, whiskey, scotch, gin. […] There was a Harlem in London 
that I used to go to, so we knew roughly what the space looked like, so when we had 
to get into design, conception, planning, the only thing we had to work out was 
what era of Harlem. We're gonna go 1920s or 1970s, '80s, more grungy warehouse 
feel because we had two different looks. 
The process of designing the venue did not result in any formal document. However, a “mood 
board” was used: 
We figured out in our head. We did a little bit of a mood board, so we just collated, 
some images, put them onto a board then we're looking at types of colour scheme, 
type of furniture, etc., drapery, you know, and all that kind of thing. 
In addition, a very rough cost estimation was produced: 
We thought, we'd cost it out, cost of labour and raw materials and etc. Furniture 
and accessories was a little bit harder because we just didn't really know what rare 
pockets of lime wood would be required so you know, extra lamps or side tables or 
stuff like that. So we had what we thought we need to just open, and we always 
knew that there's gonna be, have to be contingency funds for finer detail, and I 
suppose, yeah we wrote down some things on a rough scale. Nothing precise, 
nothing that we'd probably go back to now and say this is what we forecasted for, 
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with a final structure to it. 
Experience in the industry, capital constraints and the fact that only two people were 
involved in building the venue led to a less rigorous budgeting process: 
But when you're that close, finger on the pulse, […] if you don't know the industry, 
you don't what you're looking for […]. And if you've got loads of money, then you 
probably have that [a rigorous budget]. You probably have someone do it and give 
you a proper work it out and cost breakdown. When you're the only operator, and 
[…] you're gonna be doing the work yourself, if something pops up, you need it 
[such as a piece of furniture], you need it. You're gonna get it. 
This is closely linked to the owners’ preferences for a more experimental approach to 
planning: 
We had an idea of what we're looking for, but we didn't really do a floor plan per se 
until we had more of the furniture and more of the look and feel, because when we 
do a floor plan we also have to distinguish how much of the space is for dining, how 
much is just for lounging and drinking. So it was hard to do the floor plan until we 
really had a true perspective of what we were gonna try […] We bought way more 
furniture than what is here now, we sent half of it back, because, like the chair you're 
sitting in, you know, we had three of them. Where would we have put three of 
them? […] 
Main challenge is cash flow […]. We bit into half the budget, smashed up a few 
walls and graffitied, tagged, and bought some second-hand leather couches. And as 
the concept developed we realised […] that [it] requires finer detail […]. So we 
probably spent close to 80 to $90,000 more on the fit out than what we wanted and 
what that really amounts to is probably 50 to 75% overspend. 
4.1.3 Launching	  
4.1.3.1 Contextual	  information	  
The bar owners assumed the process of building the bar would take 8 weeks from when they 
started to actively work on it. Despite the hard work they put in, it took 14 weeks to build it and 
the bar opened in November 2011. Kieran reported that the extra time they spent on refining the 
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details of the interior was worth the delay because part of the value proposition was to offer a 
unique space. Since Kieran and Adam owned other bars, this delay was not a problem for the 
staff because they could work at other venues while Kieran and Adam were finishing Harlem on 
Central. The antecedents and planning process relevant to this stage and visualised in Figure 27 
are elaborated in the following section. 
Figure 27: Harlem: Antecedents and planning process at the stage of launching 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.1.3.2 Antecedent	  and	  planning	  process	  
Designing the interior and the menu was an “ever-evolving thing” and remained a planning issue 
after launch. 
In regard to budgeting and monitoring cash flow, Kieran found that establishing a new bar in 
Manly takes time, resulting in a net loss at the beginning. Because he and his business partners 
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ran other bars in Manly, they could afford such a loss. They kept an eye on the numbers but they 
did not create a formal cash flow statement or forecast with clear-cut goals. Rather, Kieran 
stressed the importance of allowing for a bit of experimenting: 
With this, come to scrutinise the books, saying we're looking at something that's 
been open for three and a half months, and be over analytical; it might alter the way 
we do things. We might start making these knee-jerk reactions and saying it's not 
working, this isn't working, etcetera. And I think that it's gonna be given a proper 
time. 
Kieran also made some interesting comments on his predisposition. He spoke about the 
importance of gut feeling and being open to change, which, amongst other factors, led to a more 
hands-on approach to building the business: 
As for sticking to a plan and, you know, saying "Well, this is what we had said we're 
going to do, so it's what we gotta do." No way, there's no rules to that. You gotta 
change with the feeling. 
Lastly, Davide Zanardo, one of the managers, explained the more day-to-day planning that was 
required after launch. This included the organisation of staff training twice a week, usually once a 
week just between managers and other staff and another time every week with an external person 
such as a brand ambassador of a beverage company. One manager was responsible for ordering 
food and drinks in accordance with the budget given, a task for which he produced a list. 
Another manager took care of the roster, which was of informal nature due to the small team 
size. Entertainment was another frequent planning task, which, for instance, involved hiring DJs 
and making sure that entertainment costs were within the scope of the budget. 
4.2 Case	  2:	  Self-­‐funded	  startup	  with	  unproven	  business	  model	  
Shane Greenup started Immortal Outdoors. As a canyoning enthusiast he was frustrated with the 
lack of good guidebooks available on this topic. This inspired him to build a platform that allows 
users to create, browse and read online guide articles of various types of outdoor activities. The 
novelty lies in the implementation of a map interface through which users co-create and browse 
these reports (see Figure 28). I interviewed Shane shortly before launch. Therefore, only two 
stages were applicable: nascent idea and actively pursuing idea. These two stages are discussed in 
the following sections. A summary of planning issues, outcomes and external people involved in 
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the process is provided in Figure 29. 
Figure 28: Immortal Outdoors website 
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Figure 29: Immortal Outdoors: Planning issues, outcomes and external people involved 
 
Note. For each planning issue, the first line represents the issue, the second line the outcome and 
the third line the external people involved. 
4.2.1 Nascent	  idea	  
4.2.1.1 Contextual	  information	  
To better understand how Immortal Outdoors came about, one needs to know about Shane’s 
prior businesses. After Shane finished his studies in Molecular Biology in 2005, he was 
introduced to a technique called sports arbitrage trading, a concept designed to give people risk-
free profits when betting on sports events by exploiting arbitrage opportunities. Early 2006, he 
started researching the concept without any intention to start a business but merely for the 
purpose of understanding whether the concept would work or not. Shane found that there was 
not a lot of quality information available and he decided to create a website and publish the 
knowledge he gained. While doing research he came across the concept of affiliate marketing and 
ways of monetising his website, which as a niche information platform ranked well on search 
engines and hence started to get traffic. At the same time Shane started to go canyoning on a 
regular basis: 
So then I realised if I'm going to do this [canyoning with his friend] every week, I 
hate... This is sort of a funny thing about me. I hate spending a lot of my time doing 
something if I don't keep something. So I decided I'll make a website and start 
writing reports of these trips […]. 
Therefore, Shane started to publish these reports from November 2007 onwards on a website 
www.TDMSKP.com, an acronym for Tedium Escapee. Because no good guidebooks on 
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canyoning existed and there was only one online resource for canyoning in Sydney, Shane 
decided to change TDMSKP into a site for guide articles. Very soon Shane realised he could have 
the public contributing and he installed the tools needed for others to be able to publish guide 
articles of all types of outdoor sports on his website. 
In 2008, Shane decided to take the concept one step further by starting from scratch and by 
developing a new application that was based on an innovative map interface and that could be 
monetised in various ways. This was the start of Immortal Outdoors. The following section 
elaborates how this process depicted in Figure 30 unfolded in more detail. 
Figure 30: Immortal Outdoors: Planning process at the stage of nascent idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.2.1.2 Antecedents	  and	  planning	  process	  
Shane said that he accidentally created a business. There was no obvious antecedent that inspired 
Shane to build Immortal Outdoors and a clear sequence of actions could not be identified. 
Although going into the depths of cognitive psychology and opportunity recognition processes 
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was outside the scope of this research, some valuable observations could nevertheless be made. In 
particular, data revealed that in Shane’s case, industry knowledge and experience was crucial in 
the opportunity recognition and development process. 
For instance, when Shane started to publish guide articles on TDMSKP, he realised that he hit 
on a niche and that his content ranked very well on search engines: 
What surprised me was how easy it was to get organic traffic through these articles. 
In addition, his experience with Sports Arbitrage Guide and affiliate marketing made him alert to 
the opportunity of monetising this organic traffic. 
When I realised when I put all those bits together, that organic long tail marketing 
approach, combined with the novelty of creating a single map interface for all the 
other outdoor activities and that's actually key here. […] I think this idea will 
revolutionise the way people deal with the outdoors. And I've seen nothing like it 
that will work they way I've just described. 
Moreover, the following statement indicated that one important dimension of industry 
knowledge was a deep understanding of customer problems, which Shane as an outdoor 
enthusiast had without a doubt. For this Web startup, such understanding combined with the 
exposure to technology resulted in a successful opportunity recognition and development 
process. 
I realised what I really, really wanted on it was a map. I found all of these guides, 
every guide I've ever seen is text-based descriptions with something like that, black 
and white drawn map or something like that. But these days, we got all these 
amazing technology like Google Maps where you have this satellite image of the 
world and you can just see everything. I'm like why can't I use this to see all the 
hikes, all the walks, all the activities in the natural world. And it just became 
glaringly obvious to me that that's what I wanted. And so that's what everything 
became about was getting that. 
4.2.2 Actively	  pursuing	  idea	  
4.2.2.1 Contextual	  information	  
Shane worked on Immortal Outdoors for four years before it went live. Because Shane was not a 
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web developer he had to outsource the coding. He contracted his first web developer in August 
2008. The developer constantly pushed deadlines and in the end did not deliver, which 
prolonged the process of building the product. In February 2010, Shane participated in the New 
Enterprise Incentive Scheme (NEIS), an Australian Government initiative that helps eligible 
people establish their own new viable business. The programme lasted for 14 weeks and provided 
incentives for Shane to go to market. Shane started to put pressure on the web developer and 
ultimately had to realise that the developer was not capable of programming the website. In 
November 2009 Shane decided to write off all the money he had put into his first developer and 
to look for a new person with the needed skills. He first searched for a technical co-founder but 
could not find anyone to join his venture. He then looked at other options to get his product 
built. Outsourcing to India would have been cheap but Shane decided not to do that because he 
could have ended up with a person similar to the first developer, who cost him a lot of money 
and never delivered. Therefore, he started to talk to web development agencies. He signed a 
contract with a small web development agency in May 2011 and was told that it would take 
around 8 weeks to build the product. Things again took longer than expected and Shane had to 
wait until the end of November 2011 to see the first prototype. The site went live shortly after 
my interview with Shane in December 2011. 
The following sections discuss the antecedents and process presented in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31: Immortal Outdoors: Antecedents and process at the stage of pursuing idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.2.2.2 `Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
Fellow entrepreneurs with technical expertise provided Shane with advice as to how to build the 
business and get the product developed. For instance, he was told that his developer should have 
progressed much faster and he should look for someone else to develop his platform. 
To receive finance, Shane participated in the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme (NEIS), an 
Australian Government initiative. The 14-week programme touched on many planning issues. 
As outlined below, Shane found these issues not to be of relevance for his business. Nevertheless, 
he wrote a business plan because it was a requirement of the programme. 
Reading various books helped Shane design the product and increased Shane’s knowledge on 
starting and running an online business: 
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So I read E-Myth on the plane... […] I'm taking these notes and I'm going, "I need 
to incorporate that into the website" like its functional idea of process. There needs 
to be a process for everything. So things need to take care of themselves. I don't have 
to get involved. So I'm like, "Oh, I have to do this so it'll work that way." 
4.2.2.3 Planning	  process	  
Shane’s main planning issues were the design of the product and the communication of this 
design to the person developing it. For the latter task, he created two documents. One was a text 
document outlining the specifications and necessary features. The other one was a spreadsheet 
showing how the interface should look. These documents were modified and functionalities were 
added as the idea grew. Shane used both the Microsoft Office suite and Google Docs to create 
these documents. Sometimes he converted Office documents when there was a need to share the 
documents.  
As outlined above, the first developer was not capable of delivering and Shane had to look for 
another developer. Shane found that the process through which he went with his first developer 
helped him gain clarity on the design of the platform. Therefore, he was able to give detailed 
specifications to the new web development agency. Shane did an overview document of two 
pages and sent it to the agency to get a quote. He later had the impression that the people who 
made the quote and developed the product did not read it thoroughly: 
Even though I gave them complete comprehensive documents, they didn't always 
check with them when they needed to. 
After Shane signed the contract, he met up with the development agency to discuss the features 
in detail. Whenever questions arose at a later stage or when Shane had new ideas, he created a 
new document and emailed it to the agency. For instance, it was only in the process of building 
the website that Shane discovered how he wanted to make money. He then wrote a document 
outlining how to implement the revenue model into the platform and sent it to the agency. In 
addition, Shane talked to the agency on Skype from time to time to check on their progress. 
After Shane was shown the prototype, he went home to write up a four-page document listing 
missing features and things that needed to be changed. For this particular document Shane used 
colour codes to mark priorities. He emailed the document and then discussed it at a face-to-face 
meeting. 
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This task of product development was not part of the NEIS programme in which Shane 
participated. Instead, he was introduced to many planning topics including customer service 
strategy, managing a small team, establishing legal and risk management requirements, 
marketing, finance, monitoring a safe workplace, establishing networks, organising the importing 
and exporting of goods, and implementing an accounting system and an operational plan. In 
addition, Shane had to write a business plan at the end of the course. Shane found: 
I learned things in it, but a lot of it I just found so unrelated to what I do. […] Her 
[the person that's running and coordinating it] concern was that my business 
wouldn't make money. Probably a valid concern, I don't know if it's going to make 
money. I don't care. It will make money if it's successful. But it needs to be 
successful first. That's all I care about, being successful. She's worried about my 
customer rate and product sales. And I didn't care about that. […] She was a 
marketer. […] But I think old-school marketers have no idea about Internet 
marketing. They're so out of touch with what it means and the differences. 
4.3 Case	  3:	  Externally-­‐funded	  startup	  with	  unproven	  business	  model	  
The third case is a highly innovative startup in the renewable energy industry. The company’s 
vision was to develop new solar thermal technology that reduces the cost of constructing and 
operating large-scale solar installations to the point where it was competitive with other, less 
sustainable energy sources. The path to commercialisation was one that took many years of 
research and required significant upfront investment to produce multiple prototypes and test 
plants. 
Because of the prolonged path to commercialisation, the startup was still in research and 
development phase when I conducted the interviews. Therefore, only two stages were applicable: 
nascent idea and actively pursuing idea. 
The following sections discuss the planning issues and outcomes summarised in Figure 32 and 
other observations relevant to this thesis. 
  81 
Figure 32: Renewable energy startup: Planning issues, outcomes and external people involved 
 
Note. For each planning issue, the first line represents the issue, the second line the outcome and 
the third line the external people involved. 
4.3.1 Nascent	  idea	  
4.3.1.1 Contextual	  information	  
Entrepreneur 1, a mechanical engineer and serial entrepreneur, decided to start a new venture in 
Australia when he moved back from the United States in 2008 after having been involved in the 
mobile phone software industry for many years. Figure 33 summarises the antecedent and 
process of this stage. 
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Figure 33: Renewable energy startup: antecedent and process at the stage of nascent idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.3.1.2 Planning	  process	  
When Entrepreneur 1 decided to start a new venture, he did not have a particular business idea 
in mind. Instead, he was looking for a business opportunity in an industry that he had 
knowledge in, that was attractive to investors and that required the development of new 
technology rather than building an extensive sales force to sell an existing product. In 2008 he 
decided to spend some time on researching the renewable energy industry and solar thermal 
power in particular: 
I was looking at lots of different ideas. So, basically renewable energy was obviously 
hot and a lot of it is what's the hot space because if you need investors to come along 
then they're wanting to be investing in the hot space. […] Renewable energy was sort 
of the next one that was hot in my space because I was a mechanical engineer. 
Entrepreneur 1 then decided to do more research on the Internet to educate himself on solar 
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thermal technologies: 
In all of these things you have got to say, "I'm gonna become an expert in this field." 
And so, you've got to... What's out there, I mean it doesn't matter what the thing is, 
if you don't understand exactly what the product offerings are, well, how are you 
gonna offer something that's better for the market. […] 
That's where Google is so good these days. So, if you dig deep enough, there's a lot 
of information out there. But that's with months of research and seeing what 
everyone had done in the past and what they're doing today. And so just a lot of 
trolling the Internet, looking for information and learning how everything works, 
talking to people, obviously, in the industry […]. 
Entrepreneur 1 found that there are four architectures used to deliver power. One technology 
was particularly promising but it was very expensive to build and hence not commercially viable. 
He decided to start a venture that innovated around this technology to drive down production 
and maintenance costs and hence make it more competitive with other sources of energy. 
4.3.2 Actively	  pursuing	  idea	  
4.3.2.1 Contextual	  information	  
While doing more research and designing a prototype, Entrepreneur 1 met Entrepreneur 2 in 
October 2008. At that time, Entrepreneur 2 and Entrepreneur 1 were both consulting to a 
venture capital firm and working to turn around a portfolio company. Entrepreneur 1 asked 
Entrepreneur 2 to come on board to help him get funding and assist with other aspects of the 
business, including planning. Later, in March 2009, the two entrepreneurs incorporated the 
company. Soon after, the first prototype was built and another person with a background in law 
and finance as well as experience in running enterprises and raising capital joined as the CEO of 
the new venture. In June 2009, the startup received funding and a fourth person, a mechatronics 
engineer, was hired. The engineer’s role was to build and test the product Entrepreneur 1 
designed. Not long after, an electronics engineer joined on a part-time basis in August 2009 to 
build software. In June 2010, the engineers started to build the first test plant. The production of 
the second test plant lasted from May 2011 to one week prior to my first interview with 
Entrepreneur 2 in December 2011. 
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Figure 34 visualises some of the information presented above along the timeline. Figure 35, on 
the other hand, shows the antecedent and process for this stage. 
Figure 34: Renewable energy startup: team 
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Figure 35: Renewable energy startup: antecedents and process at the stage of pursuing idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.3.2.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
The entrepreneurs applied for several grants. For the first application, they were required to write 
a 30-page business plan outlining the team, market opportunity, solution, company operations, 
competitive landscape and financial projections. Entrepreneur 2, who wrote the business plan, 
remembered: 
They wouldn't accept a pitch deck as a business plan. It had to be a 30-page [actual 
plan was 33 pages] A4 document. So we got one. We've never looked at it since. […] 
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And so it's got all the normal structure. Executive summary, market potential, and 
then who would be the customers, and what's our technology and what's our path to 
commercialisation and how we protect your IP and cash flows out for five years, and 
all that sort of stuff. So that was the first one we wrote for that grant. Now we didn't 
get that grant and we've applied to some other grants subsequently, but they never 
required a business plan, the later ones, so we've never updated or changed it. 
Industry-related planning norms also had an impact on the planning process. It is common 
practice in the industry to work with product and plant models when developing the product for 
two reasons. First such a model is required to break down engineering complexities. Second, 
environmental complexity required such planning as Entrepreneur 2 reported: 
When you're building one of these [power plants], you need to have a balance sheet 
that someone would be comfortable with or a bank would be comfortable enough 
suing, to build it. […] [Our] commercialisation path […] is really the guts of this 
sort of business […]. How do you get your product and your concept credible 
enough that someone will invest and buy them from you, which is not a product you 
have if you're making web software or small fluffy toys. 
4.3.2.3 Planning	  process	  
After Entrepreneur 2 agreed to become part of the venture, he and Entrepreneur 1 conducted 
some research on photovoltaics and wind farms. At the end of 2008, the two entrepreneurs 
engaged in formal planning for the first time. As shown in Figure 36, planning evolved around 
three issues: developing the product, pitching to investors and applying for grants. 
Figure 36: Planning issues and outcomes before investment 
 
  87 
Entrepreneur 2 built the product model that was then used by Entrepreneur 1 to calculate the 
best combination of technologies to produce a solar thermal power solution that is commercially 
competitive with other sources of energy. The plant model tied in closely with the product model 
and financial calculations as Entrepreneur 1 reported: 
So a lot of this business has been, how do you model a power station? And that's 
complex model because it's like all of your costs but then what's your revenues, 
revenues based on prices for power, plus government subsidies, all of this stuff. And 
so, actually know whether you've got something that's performing, you need to 
develop a model like this. […] We spent a lot of time on that to get it right because 
that was the only way we can prove whether or not we can deliver at the costs we're 
saying, without actually building one. 
To pitch to investors, Entrepreneur 2 created a pitch deck. He reported the content as follows: 
It [the pitch deck] started off saying that this is what we do. We build solar thermal 
power stations. We talked a little bit about why this is important, and global and 
Australian things driving it. We explained what our technology is and why it's 
different. We'd done some analysis of what the other alternatives out there in terms 
of photovoltaic and other wind farms and bits and pieces. […] So as you can see, we 
had... This is essentially our plan and this is what we're going to do. So our people... 
And then sort of why we're good guys and what's going on. 
To produce the business plan mentioned above, Entrepreneur 2 could partly draw on data he 
had already prepared in the process of producing the pitch deck. The rest of the data, such as 
information about competitors and gas price forecasts he had to gather through research. 
Entrepreneur 2 was not sure whether preparing this business plan added any value beyond being 
able to apply for that government grant: 
It might have [benefited]. It's hard to remember now. […] It's hard to say whether 
we had a perfect vision of the future and we just articulated it or if this helped us 
articulate it. 
Because Entrepreneur 2 had extensive experience as a strategy consultant, I asked him whether he 
thought business plans are more suitable for larger, established corporations: 
Yes, yeah definitely. It's the sort of thing you do inside a corporation, although it was 
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lots of words. So it's the way you do it in the old days. Nowadays, you just do with 
PowerPoint, but it's the same thing. But I guess they [the government] wanted some 
proof that we had thought through these things and we're not some fly-by-night 
operation. The fact of the matter is that you can pay someone to write your business 
plan and it’ll look pretty good. It doesn't mean you've done any thinking. […] We 
didn't get their grant. And so funnily enough, the people who did […] they haven't 
managed to raise the matching money, so nothing's got built. 
After the startup received investment in June 2009, the planning issues listed in Figure 36 
continued to be of importance. 
Pitching the business model to investors and to grant providers in the form of presentations 
remained a frequent task. By the time of interviewing in December 2011, the pitch deck had 
undergone 85 iterations and the last version contained 15 pages. Entrepreneur 2 reported: 
Our pitch deck changes each time. Sometimes it just changes because some of the 
external data has changed. For example, we have a section that talks about what 
other companies are doing in this space. And when new things happen, we have to 
update that. […] There are some things in there now, parts of technology that we 
didn't have when we first started. […] We've got a lot more numbers now about 
what our plant would perform at and how it would work. […] This [version] is 
talking about our key differentiators because we've done a lot more analysis on what 
our competitors actually do […]. 
It also got split up in two separate slide decks and presentations: 
Recently it split because one of the things we had to do in our very first early 
documents, we were explaining the industry we are in which is solar thermal power, 
and then we were explaining what our startup [name changed] is. The world's 
evolved quite a bit. […] We have a separate document that explains what solar 
thermal power is. And there is a different document, which explains our startup 
[name changed]. So, most people who we go to see now they understand solar 
thermal. They just want to know about us, but occasionally we meet someone who 
doesn't know about solar thermal, so we can still talk about solar thermal then talk 
about our startup [name changed] and what we are doing. 
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By further probing, Entrepreneur 2 revealed that the pitch deck also changed because the 
business model shifted: 
We started out and said, "Look, we want to build solar thermal power plants and we 
will buy the technology you need and we will build the plants." But very early on 
within the first couple of weeks, months, we realised there was no supply chain. 
There was no technology you could buy today that's economic. So very quickly we 
realised, we're going to have to develop some technology. So ever since then we have 
been saying we're a company that develops the technology so you can build plants. 
Interestingly enough, the co-founders expected such shifting from the outset: 
It was never we are going to do that or we're just going to go home. We always knew 
it was going to evolve. 
For both investment rounds, a term sheet was created: 
For us, a term sheet is an abbreviated shareholders agreement. One of them is two 
pages that just said, "This is how much money was going in. This would be the dates 
which would be drawn down on. This is how much equity the person who is giving 
the money is going to get at various times. And what our milestone deliverable 
would be that we had to hit." 
Product development remained one of the main planning issues for the startup, as Entrepreneur 
2 reported: 
Our strategy has always been: build the prototype, build a small test plant, build a 
semi-commercial scale one, and then build a full commercial scale plant. And that's 
sort of always been our structure, but what size those plants are, where that would be 
has changed around a bit over time 
Over time, calculations became more complex and the multi-page spreadsheet grew to a 19MB 
file. Whereas the initial calculations were about what technology to use, at later stages plant 
modelling was undertaken to calculate the most efficient setup of the system and the potential 
output and return on investment of the product. Entrepreneur 2 reported: 
Working out what's the correct shape of the field that gives you the most price 
performance, which is quite an important thing because you have to take into 
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account the position of the sun, the position of the heliostat, the position of the 
heliostat at the front. […] And then the second thing is okay, now what would a 
plant like that produce if it was 250 megawatts big, which is about half of the big gas 
power stations or the big coal power station. What would that produce every year or 
over its 30-year life? And what would be the return? So it's about understanding 
what's the sun's input, what's the performance of the field across the year, […] how 
much power you get, what does the power sell for? 
In addition to plant modelling, other planning issues shown in Figure 37 became relevant before 
setting up the two test plants. 
Figure 37: Planning issues and outcomes after launching 
 
First, there was a budget that estimated the time and costs to build a test plant. For the first test 
plant, Entrepreneur 2 paid particular attention to what he referred to as “actuals tracking”, or in 
other words, how much the budget deviated from the real costs. The information gathered 
informed the next budget, which was built before producing the next test plant. 
Second, Entrepreneur 2 created a cash flow forecast, which by the time of writing had undergone 
four iterations: 
Cash flow is actually a pretty simple thing. You say, "Well, how much money have 
you got and how much are you going to spend?" But when you start up, you keep 
changing your mind about how you're going to spend it and you have multiple ways 
of spending it at the same time. […] I know how much money we've got right now 
and I know roughly how much it takes for salaries and operating expenses, but then 
you have money left over. So we've got a grant application at the moment that says 
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we would use half the money we have plus the money from the grant to do a certain 
thing, but if we don't get that grant application, we're going to do something 
different. And even if we got that grant application, we might say, "No, we don't 
want it. We want to do something different." So modelling out those various things 
and saying what would that mean in terms of cash flow is something that's tricky 
that I haven't quite mastered yet. 
Entrepreneur 1 explained cash flow planning in more detail and stressed the importance of the 
such planning: 
And we look at lots of different other scenarios, so we'll budget scenarios if we do 
this, where does our cash go to? If we got into trouble at this point and we fall back 
where does that cash flow go to? So, all of that I mean it's a bit like playing the 
airline pilot who's looking for the next safe place to land if the engine falls off in two 
minutes time. So I'm very cognisant of were we are all the time and what the options 
are because the engine could fall off and we're in big trouble and we need a year to 
fix it. […] Earlier on I didn't care if we had the money for the next three months, 
because we didn't have anything at that point, there wasn't a lot of value that we 
created. Whereas now, the last thing I want is to go bust. 
Third, a Gantt chart similar to the one shown in Figure 38 was produced to manage the 
manufacturing process, which involved many suppliers from overseas. In retrospect, 
Entrepreneur 2 found the chart, which was created in Microsoft Project, of little use. He said 
that there were too many things that were uncontrollable and therefore the chart was not very 
useful. This included suppliers delivering late, strikes at ports, late customs clearance or bad 
weather resulting in delays in setting up the test plant.  
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Figure 38: Example of a Gantt chart 
 
Note. Reprinted from Wikipedia (2012) 
All the planning issues and planning outcomes mentioned above also required a great amount of 
short-term planning. Entrepreneur 1 and 2 often sat together with the CEO to discuss ideas, the 
next steps to do and to engage in brainstorming. A white board was used to collect and organise 
thoughts and after the meeting a picture of the whiteboard was taken. Some of the things 
discussed in the meeting became to-do items in a software solution that integrated with the other 
Google products the team used to manage information. Other information was put into 
presentation documents and sometimes reused later for the pitch deck. 
Lastly, both entrepreneurs had some interesting general thoughts on planning in innovative 
startups. Entrepreneur 2 explained how a startup does not follow a clear path and things hardly 
ever go to according to plan: 
It seemed like its really messy, right? It's very... It's evolutionary. It's not the way 
you'd logically do it. It's more the way it happened and it's not the textbook way. 
Entrepreneur 1 made a statement that – at first hearing – was somewhat unexpected given the 
sophisticated planning undertaken: 
I think in all of these sorts of things in startups, a lot of it is seat of your pants […]. 
So you can't over-analyse with the direction you're going. […] You've got to know, 
"I think this is where I'm going to go". And then you verify it later. […] We're 
analysing right now a design that we did for one part of the system and when we 
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built it the first time. I thought it was a pretty nice design. We built it and it worked 
about 50% of what we needed it to do. Now we're iterating and we're actually now 
doing the detailed calculations. […] Now you could have said, "Okay, do that up 
front." And if you worked for Boeing, you probably worked on it up front, but it 
might have taken you then a year to make it, whereas we made it in two weeks. 
4.4 Case	  4:	  Externally-­‐funded	  startup	  with	  proven	  business	  model	  
Spreets is a collective buying platform connecting consumers with small businesses in Australia 
and New Zealand. Collective buying, also known as group buying, offers products and services at 
significantly reduced prices on the condition that a certain amount of buyers commit to the 
purchase (see Figure 39). Small businesses use group-buying sites as a marketing tool to acquire 
new customers and to get additional income in seasons of low revenue. Buyers, on the other 
hand, benefit from heavy discounts. Those buyers who register their email address receive daily 
emails on different things to do in their city (e.g. restaurants, bars, beauty, adventure). Because 
these deals only activate if a minimum number of people buy them, the buyers are incentivised to 
share the deal with their friends, which maximises exposure for the business and voucher sales for 
Spreets. 
Figure 39: Screenshot spreets.com.au 
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When Spreets launched in Sydney in February 2009, other businesses based on the same business 
model were already established in the US. Spreets introduced this business model to two new 
markets, Australia and New Zealand. The co-founders expected the Australian and New Zealand 
group-buying market to become a very competitive space within months. Hence, the goal was to 
get investment and to grow as quickly as possible. 
The following sections address the various stages of planning that Spreets encountered: nascent 
idea, actively pursuing idea, launching, scaling, pre acquisition and post acquisition (see Figure 
40). For each stage, relevant contextual information is provided first. In line with the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 2, observations related to antecedents and processes are then 
discussed. 
Figure 40: Spreets' growth 
 
To provide the reader with an overview, Figure 41 summarises planning issues, outcomes and 
external people involved in the planning process across all stages. 
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Figure 41: Spreets: Planning issues, outcomes and external people involved 
 
Note. For each planning issue, the first line represents the issue, the second line the outcome and 
the third line the external people involved. 
4.4.1 Nascent	  idea	  
4.4.1.1 Contextual	  information	  
Dean McEvoy, Spreets founder and CEO at the time of writing, has a background in business 
consulting, marketing and advertising. His first entrepreneurial venture was a bar and restaurant, 
which he opened in 2001 and sold in 2003. Later, Dean started an online restaurant reservation 
system called Booking Angel. When Dean was in Silicon Valley to raise capital for Booking 
Angel and to try and enter the U.S. market, he learned about the group-buying business model. 
Dean instantly recognised the potential of the business model. Later that year, in October 2009, 
Dean returned to Australia where he continued to build Booking Angel and to look for ways to 
integrate the group-buying model into Booking Angel (see Figure 42). By talking to investors 
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and entrepreneurs, he realised that Booking Angel was “old news”. 
Figure 42: Spreets: Antecedent and process at the stage of nascent idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.4.1.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
When seeking to establish Booking Angel in the U.S. market, Dean engaged in a discussion 
about the main challenges he was facing with Booking Angel in June 2009. The investor he was 
talking to pointed him to the first group-buying site called Groupon, which had launched in 
Chicago in November 2008. 
4.4.1.3 Planning	  process	  
Industry knowledge made Dean alert to the opportunity and allowed him to understand the 
group-buying business model instantly without visualising or formalising any parts of it. As a bar 
owner, Dean knew how hard it can be to find new customers. In particular, his experience taught 
him that traditional marketing channels such as local newspapers or yellow pages are very 
expensive and do not deliver a clear return on investment for small merchants. Dean’s experience 
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with Booking Angel also helped him in this process because both businesses address the same 
problem – “how to deliver new customers online to local business”. However, other than with 
Booking Angel, the group-buying model delivers immediate and significant sales to the 
merchant. Hence, Dean’s industry knowledge and experience allowed him to instantly 
understand the potential of the group-buying model: 
[Booking Angel] gave me a deep understanding of the problems that this Spreets 
models solves. […] I knew that the marriage of both – delivering more business to 
local business and also helping people finding interesting things to do – was like the 
silver bullet, the holy grail, of what needed to happen in what I call the ‘local search 
market’. 
Dean then started talking to peers to further validate the business model: 
A lot of people said that Apple had tried something similar with the thing they called 
‘Swarm’ where they basically said that if enough people were interested in a certain 
piece of software then you got it at a discount. […] And it unlocked it for everyone. 
So people related that feedback back to me like, "Oh yeah, that worked for them. It 
was really successful." That swarm mentality is becoming more popular with social. 
So the feedback was good around that. […] The feedback just kind of validated for 
me that, well, it's a good business model. It could work. It's a big opportunity. 
The next step was to think of ways how to integrate the business model into Booking Angel: 
"Could we do it as a spin-off of Booking Angel and potentially use the database of 
Booking Angel if we needed to in the beginning?" And then I got feedback from 
people that Booking Angel would be old news. Like just stop it and start again. No 
one wanted to be tied to the old business. Then I was, "Okay. Well, I've to stop 
Booking Angel, clean, and start again afresh with new investors, and new people, and 
new team”. 
Dean needed no further information to take the decision of abandoning Booking Angel and 
starting a new business: 
I didn't have to do research because I knew that we had kind of experimented with 
the same model with Booking Angel. 
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4.4.2 Actively	  pursuing	  the	  idea	  
4.4.2.1 Contextual	  information	  
After Dean decided to “start again afresh”, he began to look for a business partner and investor. 
He found someone interested and sat down with this person to create the first formal document, 
an Excel spreadsheet (see Figure 43). The two did not end up going into business together. 
Instead, Dean pitched his idea to Pollenizer, an incubator for Internet startups, at the Pollenizer 
Christmas party. Pollenizer agreed to build the technology for Dean’s business idea in exchange 
for some equity as well as cash and under the condition that if the viability of the business model 
could not be proven within one month after launch, Pollenizer would take the platform down. 
Dean moved into Pollenizer’s office and Phil Morle and his team started to build the technology 
in January 2010. 
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Figure 43: Spreets: Antecedents and process at the stage of pursuing idea 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.4.2.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
The people at Pollenizer were strong advocates of the ‘lean startup methodology’, which had 
spread from Silicon Valley into many other Internet startup scenes. According to Eric Ries, who 
has coined and trademarked the term ‘Lean Startup’, lean startups are born out of three trends, 
two of which are particularly relevant for this thesis: customer development and agile product 
development. 
Customer development is a process designed to quickly validate market assumptions. Because 
Spreets was the first company to introduce the group-buying model to the Australian market, the 
people at Pollenizer wanted to test whether there was demand for the product. They said they 
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would only build the product if Dean could convince at least five small businesses to sign up. 
This was referred to as “manual testing” and the idea behind was to test first and build after. Phil 
stressed the importance of such testing and the ability to sell: 
Being an entrepreneur is like being a street fighter you just kind of roll up the sleeves 
and then go to talk to customers. […] Failing entrepreneurs don't understand the act 
of selling and just getting in a conversation with real customers who are actually 
going to give you money or not. 
Agile software development, on the other hand, is the process of building software in an iterative 
and incremental manner. As shown in Figure 44, tying product development closely to customer 
feedback increases the chances of building something that matches a demand in the market. In 
addition, constant feedback and incremental development shortens feedback loops, allows for 
agility and decreases the time to market. 
Figure 44: The Lean Startup approach 
 
Note. Adapted from Cooper & Vlaskovits (2010, p. 28) 
4.4.2.3 Planning	  process	  
When Dean decided to build the business, he found a potential business partner and investor. 
The first formal document, an Excel spreadsheet, was created: 
I found a guy who was interested and had money and sat down with him and did a 
bit of a business plan, which was essentially just a Excel spreadsheet of what we 
thought the numbers could look like and... Who would do what, what resources 
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we'd need, sales people, what we'd need to spend on marketing to acquire the 
database at least to prove it out initially. […] Could we hire a development team? 
How would we find them?  
Interesting here is that Dean later referred to this document as the “business plan” and the 
“business model”. While the document was of tactical nature, it also assisted the entrepreneurs in 
formulating the business model. At this stage it helped Dean develop the organisation. 
The insights gained in this process then informed the first discussion Dean had with Pollenizer 
once they agreed to incubate Spreets. They found that all resources listed in the spreadsheet 
either Pollenizer or Dean could provide: 
It helped me realise what resources were needed and actually when it came to talking 
to Phil, it helped me realise that actually we don't need money because I can find 
people to do all the things we need. […] We need a little bit of money to pay for ad 
words and stuff like that, but apart from that it's just some hosting costs, domain 
registrations, and... And then you realise that most of the costs we needed were just 
people costs, so finding people that can do it for us instead. 
Before Pollenizer agreed to build the product they required Dean to do some “customer 
development” and “manual testing” to get validation on the business idea and “establish the 
quickest path to a minimum viable product”. Phil from Pollenizer remembered: 
Dean called [merchants} and said, "Hey I'm Dean, I'm from Spreets. Here's the 
idea, here's how it works". And that already started to inform what the product 
could be, so of course, the first couple of calls, the first 100 calls we kind of explained 
it badly, the process was weak. The whole question was what was in it for the 
merchant. They were criticising it. They were not interested, because it was a 
discounting service, which was bad for their brand and commoditised their product. 
So we learned a lot about how to contextualise it, therefore, what the admin site had 
to be like, how the site needed to present itself, just generally understanding which 
things were important. 
As shown in Figure 45, once some demand was proven, Pollenizer started to build a “minimum 
viable product", a very basic product that had just enough features so it would deliver value to 
the customer. The customer development process continued after the minimum viable product 
  102 
was released but instead of manual testing, the product was used to gather feedback from the 
market. Based on this feedback Dean, as the product owner, together with Pollenizer defined 
weekly “sprints” in which features that needed to be built or bugs that had to be removed were 
specified. Phil further explained: 
So each of those weekly sprints was really the sort of an ongoing Lamington test [an 
exercise in which Pollenizer gives nascent entrepreneurs Lamingtons to sell on the 
street and the person who sells most, wins], just trying to sell things, just trying to 
get out and talk to customers, find out what the problems are, feeding that learning 
back into the product and getting it out there. 
Figure 45: Testing before building Spreets’ platform 
 
 
Figure 46: Traditional feedback mechanism 
 
As Dean reported, the idea of building the business iteratively and incrementally also informed 
the subsequent stages Spreets went through: 
Just launch quickly, validate that it works, get some revenue in the door to prove it, 
and then use that to go out and raise money to invest and stuff like that. So the 
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process was about just quickly proving it in market, not a lot of planning. It was 
kind of like this is a business. This is an idealist tested in the real world because you 
don't really know whether it's going to work or not until you try. That's the problem 
with new technology. It's new; people haven't seen it before. If you ask them if they 
want it, you can do surveys till you're blue in the eyes, but it's actually only real 
usage that drives... Well it should, real usage that should drive real decisions I think 
for startups. […] Put in place an idea of how you think you might get there. Do it 
and test it and see if it actually results in what you are hoping for. […] If it doesn't, 
you iterate, you change quickly […] That's kind of the philosophy with which we 
grew the business and started it. It's the same philosophy with which we just kind of 
drove the online marketing, tried a 100 things, and the 10 best things that worked 
we kept doing them. And the things that didn't, we stopped. 
Lastly, the Pollenizer team sought to maintain a state of continuous momentum. It was agreed 
that if the first release of the platform could not be built and launched within six weeks, 
Pollenizer would withdraw. Phil explained: 
The problem is, if you don't have a very, very hard deadline, you […] effectively 
never release because there is always something else you can do especially with a 
website. 
4.4.3 Launching	  
4.4.3.1 Contextual	  information	  
The platform launched only 32 working days after Pollenizer agreed to build the product. The 
exact date was 4 Feburary 2009, which happened to be Dean’s birthday. Spreets organised a 
small launch party and it was there where I met Dean for the first time. Justus Hammer, who 
became co-founder later, attended as well. At that time, Justus worked for GetPrice.com.au, a 
price comparison site, where he was responsible for marketing. Pollenizer and GetPrice.com.au 
had done business before and that was the reason why Justus knew some of the people at 
Pollenizer. Nevertheless, it was at the launch party that he heard about Spreets for the first time. 
When Justus left the party he had no intention to join Spreets. However, he planned to leave 
GetPrice.com.au mid February. Knowing that Justus was looking for a new challenge, Daniel 
Jarosch, a Sydney-based German entrepreneur and co-founder of BrandsExclusive, an online 
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premium fashion shopping club, put Justus in touch with his German investors, Oliver Jung and 
Klaus Hommels. As these investors explained to Justus, they wanted to launch a Groupon clone 
in Australia. Justus spoke to the investors on the phone and flew to London two days after, where 
Justus and the investors agreed on the terms to invest in a group-buying site in Australia. Justus 
returned to Australia to look for a team to start a group-buying site. 
A few days later, Dean, who was actively looking for investors, was introduced to Oliver Jung 
through his own contacts and flew to Europe. The investors then got back to Justus and said he 
could either join Dean or build his own business. Justus met up with Dean and found out that 
Dean, with the help of Pollenizer, already had the basic technology ready. They both found that 
Justus’ marketing skills and Dean’s sales experience would complement very well. Hence, they 
decided to team up and the next day they started working together in the Pollenizer office. 
Shortly after Justus joined, their first competitor, Scoopon, appeared. Scoopon is a spin-off of 
Catch of a Day, a website with daily deals for physical products. Using the database of Catch of a 
Day, Scoopon managed to sell 2,000 vouchers, which instantly proved the viability of the 
business concept. It became clear to Dean and Justus that they would very soon face a lot of 
competition. 
Figure 47 summarises the antecedents and process discussed in this section. 
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Figure 47: Spreets: Antecedents and process at the stage of launching 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.4.3.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
4.4.3.2.1 Environmental	  velocity	  
Pollenizer built the product on the condition that revenue had to be made no longer than eight 
weeks after the first release went live. As Phil reported, the velocity of the environment, and in 
particular the speed at which new competitors emerged, informed this decision: 
If we had done Spreets as a business plan methodology […] with a big document 
[and] market research […] we would be dead. Honestly, we just didn't have the time 
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to work that slowly. 
Pollenizer also made other contributions, including suggestions as to what systems to put in place 
to facilitate processes as well as “some good tips on the marketing side and sales side”. Although 
Pollenizer had a stake in Spreets, it was Spreets who “called the priorities”. This made sense to 
the co-founders since, through their investors, they “had all the knowledge from around the 
world” as to how to build a group-buying business. 
4.4.3.2.2 Future	  investors	  
Justus found that spending one day at an already established group-buying business helped him 
in the planning process. After he agreed to build a group-buying site in Australia, he flew to 
Berlin to spend one day at a three-month-old German group-buying company the same investors 
had put money in. By talking to the management team, by seeing what systems and processes 
they built and how they structured the company, he gained enough knowledge to fully 
understand the business model and how to set up the company as well as what he would do 
differently in this process: 
I just talked to everybody in there from the CTO, the CEO, they had a COO back 
then. And they were massively overstaffed from my point of view, but it was good to 
see how they actually tackled their system, and how they tackled the processes, and 
what they were doing in sales, and how they build up the company; what kind of 
structure they have, what kind of departments, editorial, marketing. […] Yeah, so it 
was a very interesting day because I kind of... That was the first time that I looked 
and go, "Okay, it makes sense." And some things they did I thought don't make 
sense, so we did it a bit differently, but it gave me a very good idea of what we have 
to do in Australia to get the company up and running. 
4.4.3.2.3 The	  need	  for	  finance	  not	  impacting	  the	  planning	  process	  
According to Justus, who after Spreets’ success became an angel investor himself, whether 
entrepreneurs are required to write a formal plan or not depends on the degree to which investors 
are familiar with the business model: 
The business model was already successful and proven in the US. So it was not so 
much about writing a business plan because our investors already knew the business 
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inside out. They had started it in Germany already for three or four months, so they 
were kind of ahead of what we were doing even though we overtook them. […] That 
was never the kind of question that we had to convince the investors to do that 
business model because they already knew that it would work. But it's completely 
different for, like for example, Tempurer [a startup Justus got involved in after 
Spreets got acquired] what I do now where it's a new business model that is actually 
not out there yet. […] For a business like that, you have to write a business plan, 
especially if you want to get the VC, investor money and seed money, whatever. 
Because the investors simply don’t know how the business model is going to work. 
So you've got to show them how the business is going to function and how it's going 
to be monetised […] So for new business that's not already out there, I think you 
definitely need a business plan. 
In addition, Justus had interesting ideas on the format of such a plan and how the most effective 
format is dependent on the investor’s preference: 
I'm not a big fan of the kind of 50-page business plan that looks at again SWOT 
analysis and all the theoretical crap […] Basically every business you can explain in 
five pages. And that's what I like much more when I get proposals now [as an 
investor] […] Show me something that I can understand. […] If […] you can't put 
it in five pages, it's probably not a great business model, right? Because it's getting 
very, very complicated. […] So explain the market, explain the business model, and 
how you're going change the market. […] But there are other investors out there 
who love that stuff [more comprehensive plans]. So, it always depends on whom you 
talk to. 
Interestingly enough, when discussing the value of a formal business plan, Justus pictured it as an 
instrument to legitimate a new, unproven businesses to investors in order to receive investment. 
Like Justus, Dean did not see any value of producing such a document for purely internal 
purposes. 
4.4.3.3 Planning	  process	  
4.4.3.3.1 Planning	  issues,	  sequence	  of	  actions	  and	  outcomes	  
When Justus joined, he first spent some time on improving the website while Dean went out to 
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talk to merchants to get deals in. Simultaneously, Justus refined the cost forecast Dean created 
and turned it first into a revenue forecast and later into a budgeting tool. Over five spreadsheets 
he calculated all expenses including marketing, human resources, sales commissions and 
infrastructure. At the same time, he used online metrics to evaluate the return on investment for 
marketing instruments, which were then used to calculate income. By deducting expenses from 
income, revenue was predicted for each month. This financial model helped Spreets manage cash 
flow, understand as well as communicate how well the business was performing and explain the 
business model to Yahoo!7. The revenue forecast evolved as the business grew to 20 sheets by the 
time of writing in November 2011 and the planning horizon changed from one month to one 
week. 
4.4.3.3.2 The	  entrepreneur	  shaping	  the	  planning	  process	  
Industry as well as entrepreneurial knowledge and experience had an impact on the planning 
process and its outcomes, resulting in a less formal and more pragmatic way of planning. Justus 
reported: 
It [the marketing plan] was not like a formal marketing plan […] Because I filled the 
database before with my competitor company in Germany [GoYellow] and especially 
with GetPrice in Australia, I knew how to build a database quickly and I knew what 
you have to do […]. […] And it [industry experience] also helped me in terms of 
building […] not the business model but the financial model behind it. […] Because 
[…] we sold the company to Yahoo!7 […] that financial background was quite good 
because I actually was able to kind of forecast and built the model in a way that 
Yahoo!7 could actually understand […] what we want to achieve and where we can 
get to. […] Getprice definitely was a major stepping-stone to be able to do Spreets. 
In addition, the entrepreneurs’ predispositions seemed to have shaped the planning process. 
Justus described himself as “not so much a dreamer, but more somebody who actually gets stuff 
done and concentrates on the things that have to get done”. Particularly, he said that he was 
better at doing things than planning things in detail. This was in line with the investors’ style of 
planning. Dean seemed to have similar preferences. “Analysis is paralysis” he found. However, 
Justus added that he “was getting better at planning”, which implies that predispositions are 
dynamic and changed in his case with growing entrepreneurship knowledge and experience (see 
Figure 13).  
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Figure 48: The co-founder's dynamic predispositions 
 
4.4.4 Scaling	  
4.4.4.1 Contextual	  information	  
According to Dean, the business started to scale at the end of March 2010 when the first sales 
people were hired: 
When it wasn't just the pressure of me closing the deal everyday. That actually made 
me realise well I can teach someone else how to sell and then they can do it. […] 
And then that's when I realised the more sales people we can get, the more deals we 
can get, the more revenue we can get, and we started to understand the metrics. We 
knew it could grow our cash flow. It could grow organically by itself, so we got it to 
a position where we didn't need the money, which I think is really important in a 
startup where you sort of put yourself in a way of not needing the money because 
people can smell desperation. 
Therefore, despite the quick success, Spreets sought investment and in April 2010, Klaus 
Hommels and Oliver Jung agreed to invest with two million dollars, which was transferred in 
May 2010. This money magnified Spreets’ growth because Spreets could now hire more sales 
people to get more deals and to increase revenue, which again allowed Spreets to hire even more 
sales people in major cities in Australia and in some cities in New Zealand. As a result of this 
growth, Spreets moved out of the Pollenizer office into their own premises in September 2010. 
Figure 49 shows the antecedents and process outlined in this section. 
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Figure 49: Spreets: Antecedents and process at the stage of scaling 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.4.4.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
The size of the team had an impact on the tactical planning issues. The majority of Spreets’ 
employees are sales people. One of the first organisational challenge Spreets faced as early as two 
months after launch when the first sales people joined was scheduling the deals they wanted to 
run on their website and managing all the sales processes. A software solution called SalesForce 
was gradually implemented to automatise these processes and facilitate planning. 
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Another challenge was to align all employees with the company’s vision as the team grew. Dean 
found that the entrepreneur is the vision and with a small team size the vision “rubs off 
naturally”. However, when the team gets bigger and some employees are no longer in close 
contact with the founders, more work is required: 
And it's only then when you sit down and you have other people around you and 
you ask them to articulate the vision. So you say, "What do you think it means? You 
describe it in your words what you think Spreets mean?" That's when you capture 
what a vision and mission is and that's how you keep consistency across the company 
as it gets bigger. How you keep the culture the same? How you keep people and 
everyone inspired and feeling the same about the business? […] I think it is just 
perpetual reinforcement. Finding team messages, you just keep saying them over and 
over again, every time you talk to someone, every time you do a company 
presentation. 
4.4.4.3 Planning	  process	  
The group-buying space became very competitive, as expected. To stay ahead of the game, 
Spreets needed to grow quickly. Dean explained: 
At the beginning it's all about growth and getting big fast and growing. It's all about 
speed and execution. You don't get things perfect, you get things 80% right, and you 
do it quickly. That was sort of the attitude then. 
According to Phil, he, Dean and Justus also sought to understand the “levers” of the business: 
Understanding the levers we were able to raise some capital on that because we could 
tell investors what they were investing in. We would literally say, "If you would give 
us $500,000 we will spend that in this way and we think that will generate this many 
users which will make the business this valuable and so on". 
The subsequent investment allowed Spreets “to pump money into the growth of the subscriber 
base through the marketing”. Besides growing the user base, the money was also used to expand 
into new cities as well as New Zealand, to increase the number of deals and to hire new sales 
people. 
To discuss these and other issues, Justus had meetings with the two German investors at least 
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once per week on Skype. Because the investors had launched group-buying sites in other 
countries before, they were able to transfer knowledge to the founders: 
Because they [the investors] were doing the same business models around the world, 
they aggregated all that knowledge, and that was really a good source of information 
for us: […] What happens around the world, what deals work around the world, and 
how to do a sales pitch and stuff like that. So we could always get some good 
feedback from them.  
The investors further shaped the planning process by urging the entrepreneurs to spend more 
money in order to grow quicker. In addition, the investors put forward certain issues they wanted 
to discuss in meetings, including the weekly progress, weekly to-do’s and key performance 
indicators such as revenue targets. 
The marketing tactics were informed by the aim of achieving competitive advantage through 
differentiation. Because of Dean’s industry experience, the entrepreneurs knew that if merchants 
had the choice between several group-buying platforms, they would choose the one with a well-
funded user base. From the viewpoint of merchants, such users were expected to purchase extra 
services and become reoccurring customers. Hence, the co-founders put thought into how to 
build a database seeded with “premium” users with disposable income willing to spend at least 70 
dollars per transaction rather than low-price bargain hunters. This led to a specific set of 
marketing tools as well as partnerships with the Australian premium shopping club 
BrandsExclusive for example. 
To stay efficient while growing, the entrepreneurs had to put systems and controls into place. 
The planning became “inwards focused” with the goal of getting “the internal structure right” to 
be able to expand rapidly. Once these systems were in place it was about optimising these systems 
as Dean explained: 
We have to be a little more careful because we're about 1.5 million people [users]. 
Even a small mistake means massive headaches for support or massive issues for a 
merchant. So we have to be more careful about what we do […] we put more 
procedures in place […] quality assurance, testing, and things like that to make sure 
that we're doing things properly. 
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4.4.5 Pre	  acquisition	  
4.4.5.1 Contextual	  information	  
In September 2010, large companies started to approach Spreets expressing their interest in 
acquiring the company. This included several companies from the US as well as some Australian 
companies. The two co-founders looked at all options and decided to sell Spreets to the company 
that was perceived as the best partner and had the most potential to grow Spreets further. Once 
the co-founders decided upon Yahoo!7 at the end of November 2010, they hired Deloitte to 
assist them in the acquisition process. The investors also brought in a person who helped Spreets 
with this process and made sure the investors’ interests were protected. The details discussed in 
this section are summarised in Figure 50. 
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Figure 50: Spreets: Antecedent and process at the stage of pre acquisition 
 
4.4.5.2 Antecedents	  of	  the	  planning	  process	  
To communicate the business to Yahoo!7, Justus’ budget was used and the co-founders held 
formal presentations at the Yahoo premises before acquisition. As one might expect, the 
acquisition process required Deloitte to produce a formal business plan. Dean had some 
interesting comments on this 10-page plan: 
It's the university version of a business plan. So it's like, vision, mission, objectives, 
competition, financial forecasts, team, market research, strategy, all the stuff. […] It 
wasn't really a good planning document. […] I never have looked at it since. […] 
  115 
But it's useful in communicating with people who don't know anything about 
business in a short period of time. 
Equally interesting was the observation that when potential acquirers approached Spreets, 
strategy-related planning issues started to surface for the first time. Dean found that “it raises a 
lot of questions about what direction you have for the company”. 
4.4.5.3 Planning	  process	  
Justus and Dean sat down to discuss “the next game-changing thing“ they needed “to do to 
embrace and maintain Spreets’ market leadership position”: 
Do you want to raise money, start spending and marketing? Or partner with 
someone? We were having an internal debate about what we would do, and that just 
started us thinking about this whole process. We were approached by a few different 
people, and Yahoo!7 was the best option in terms of the ability to reach people in 
multiple areas, including online, television and so on. They talked about their ability 
to crunch data, and we thought that would be the best way to move forward. 
4.4.6 Post	  acquisition	  
4.4.6.1 Contextual	  information	  
It only took Spreets seven weeks to finalise the deal and Spreets became acquired on 20 January 
2011 for an estimated 40 million dollars. The acquisition did not result in any suspension of 
staff. Both co-founders kept their position as Chief Operating Officer (Dean) and Chief 
Marketing Officer (Justus). Spreets now had a board of directors they had to report to (see Figure 
51) and the whole team moved into the Yahoo!7 premises in May 2011. 
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Figure 51: Spreets: Antecedent and process at the stage of post acquisition 
 
Note. Emergent constructs are marked with ‘(e)’. 
4.4.6.2 Planning	  process	  
As one would expect, the acquisition of Spreets resulted in more formalised planning. Spreets 
reported to Yahoo!7’s financial department as well as to Yahoo!7’s CEO and the rest of the board 
In addition, in order to discuss issues and to seek advice, the co-founders met up monthly with 
Yahoo!7’s ‘steering committee’ consisting of some of the key people in the organisation, which in 
some instances resulted in a formal presentation. 
Most of these meetings with different members of the organisation were informal discussions. 
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However, once a year, the co-founders held a formal presentation in front of the committee to 
plan the next year. According to Dean, prior to that meeting, key people at Spreets, including the 
finance team, sat together to share “their plans for the next year […] what they're doing […] 
what their priorities are”. The goal was to come up with a plan that aligned well with Yahoo!7’s 
overall plans. Dean reported: 
Essentially the finance team sort of helps prepare the budget for next year, which is 
based upon what we planned originally and our performance this year and what we 
need to do, and then we sort of look at those numbers and go, "Is that reasonable? 
Can we achieve those numbers? What can we tweak? How many extra sales people 
do we need to bring on and in what areas and what will that cost?" So there's a lot 
more planning now in terms of thinking because we know the model, but there's still 
the element of unknown and we still apply that same startup principle of let's just try 
this stuff and see what happens. […] [We come up with] solutions that align with 
[…] [Yahoo!7’s directives] and also help us achieve what our financial goals are for 
the next year and strategic goals and then we cost them out and work out... Prioritise 
them work out when they're going to happen, and then we allocate responsibilities 
who's going to make sure it happens. 
Dean also explained the content of the presentation: 
So, it's essentially numbers and what our brand means for us and our position in the 
market and then what we kind of do is understand the decision funnel so this is what 
people go through to sign up to Spreets. So you have to be aware of interests, sign 
up, pick on a deal, open our emails, purchase, after the deal, whatever, and then we 
set metrics against each of those. […] Each department then owns different metrics. 
So Products owns those. Business Operations and Content kind of owns those. 
Marketing owns these, and Sales owns kind of the deals and the after deals. And it's 
kind of the way we think about the business. 
Interesting here is that for the first time, planning took place not only at the stage of tactics and 
the business model but also on a strategic level. Justus said: 
Now it's kind of getting a bit more strategic. […] How do we differentiate Spreets 
from rest of the market? Where do we position it in the market? What should the 
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brand stand for? And we've done a little work on that and kind of one of the results 
is the TV campaign and our new tag line, "It seems better when the deal is better." 
And there's also kind of an ideal and a future [looking for the right word] kind of a 
vision behind it now […] And now we agreed on the kind of the little steps that we 
have to take in-between to actually get us to that vision. […] Which […] makes the 
whole thing a bit more theoretical and strategic. […] If you look at kind of where 
the company is now and the size that we are now, […] that's how where you want to 
get to after all and what you have to tackle. 
Dean, who had started the business, had a slightly different view on the corporate vision. He 
believed that there had always been an implicit vision: 
There [at the early stages] were no strategy meetings, "What's your vision? What's 
mission?" I think that's a load of shit. I think actually in the startup stage it's a waste 
of time because the vision and mission is the entrepreneur. Like you don't have to 
articulate what's in your head because you have a vision and you have a mission, and 
you just sell it. You live and breath it, and you sell it. 
4.5 Summary	  
Atheoretical descriptions of four cases with varying degrees of length and complexity were 
presented in this chapter. These descriptions were guided by the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter 2 and the research questions presented in Chapter 3. The findings informed the 
following chapter, which analyses and discusses the observations from the cases studied. 
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5 ANALYSIS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
This thesis aims to understand early-stage entrepreneurial planning. Theory from various narrow 
streams of literature were combined to create a priori constructs and a theoretical framework that 
could be used to guide data collection and analysis. Based on the theory reviewed, the following 
research questions were put forward. At different stages in time: (i) what are antecedents of 
entrepreneurial planning; (ii) how do certain characteristics of the entrepreneur affect planning; 
and (iii) what are planning issues, sequence of actions and process outcomes. This chapter 
discusses findings related to these questions and how confronting the theory developed in 
Chapter 2 with such findings resulted in the framework shown in Figure 52. 
Figure 52: Refined theoretical framework 
 
Note. Emergent constructs were marked with ‘(e)’. Constructs that were not supported by data 
were crossed out. Not all planning dimensions applied to all archetypes. 
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5.1 Levels	  of	  planning	  
The a priori theoretical framework was informed by Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart’s (2011) 
notion of three levels on which entrepreneurial planning can unfold: on the level of strategy 
making, on the level of business modelling and on the level of tactical planning (see Figure 2). 
Data from the cases studied supported the notion of various levels on which entrepreneurial 
planning can unfold. For instance, all entrepreneurs faced a wide range of tactical planning issues 
such as product development, marketing, sales or budgeting. 
Another commonality that all cases shared was that they first engaged in opportunity recognition 
before engaging in any other type of planning. In the two cases in which entrepreneurs built a 
new venture based on an existing business model, opportunity recognition happened instantly. 
Dean from Spreets was presented a new business model and his past experience allowed him to 
recognise its potential immediately. In a similar vein, the co-founders of Harlem Bar knew that a 
bar with an alternative concept could be a success and therefore did not hesitate to take over the 
lease when the owners of Frankie’s Number decided to close their business. On the other hand, 
where entrepreneurs created a new business model, opportunity recognition occurred over time. 
In the case of the renewable energy startup, the first founder actively engaged in the process of 
seeking business opportunities and comparing various options. Shane from Immortal Outdoors 
discovered business opportunities as he built the first iteration of his business and discovered new 
technologies and revenue models in this process. Surprisingly, Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart did 
not mention opportunity recognition in their planning framework despite it being a well-
established concept in entrepreneurship literature. 
The other two levels of planning, business modelling and strategy making, only applied to some 
of the new ventures studied (see Table 4). The founders of both the renewable energy startup and 
Spreets spent a considerable amount of time modelling the business, which included developing 
the value proposition and the product, budgeting costs, defining mechanisms to capture revenue 
and creating a marketing strategy. Of all the cases studied, only Spreets dealt with planning issues 
of strategic nature such as market positioning and differentiation. Interestingly enough, these 
strategic issues did not emerge until the company scaled up and was acquired. 
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Table 4: Cross-case analysis of levels of planning along stages 
	   no	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Spreets)	  
Nascent	  idea	   Opportunity	  
recognition	  
Opportunity	  
recognition	  
Opportunity	  
recognition	  
Opportunity	  
recognition	  &	  
business	  modelling	  
Actively	  pursuing	  
idea	  
Tactical	  planning	   Tactical	  planning	   Business	  modelling	  
&	  tactical	  planning	  
Business	  modelling	  
&	  tactical	  planning	  
Launching	   Tactical	  planning	   	   	   Tactical	  planning	  
Scaling	   	   	   	   Tactical	  planning	  
Pre	  acquisition	   	   	   	   Strategy	  making	  &	  
tactical	  planning	  
Post	  acquisition	   	   	   	   Strategy	  making	  &	  
tactical	  planning	  
 
Hence, for the cases studied, it can be said that certain levels of planning build on other levels of 
planning (see Figure 53). In each of the four cases, opportunity recognition occurred first. Then, 
in some cases, planning issues evolved on the level of business modelling. All entrepreneurs had 
to deal with tactical planning. Lastly, the co-founders of Spreets, who went through the highest 
number of planning stages, engaged in strategy making shortly before and after acquisition. 
Figure 53: Levels of planning building on each other 
 
(Strategy	  
making)	  
TacXcal	  
planning	  
(Business	  
modelling)	  
Opportunity	  
recogniXon	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Note. Business modelling and strategy making only occurred in some of the cases studied. 
5.2 Antecedents	  
The framework developed in Chapter 2 drew on various theories from different streams of 
literature to suggest antecedents of entrepreneurial planning. As shown in Figure 54, not all 
antecedents were supported by the data collected (see Table 5). 
Figure 54: Revised antecedents 
 
Note. Emergent antecedents were marked with ‘(e)’. Antecedents that were not supported by data 
were crossed out. 
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Table 5: Cross-case analysis of antecedents along stages 
	   no	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Spreets)	  
Nascent	  idea	   	   	   	   Peer	  
Actively	  pursuing	  
idea	  
Capital	  constraints	  
Team	  size	  
Peers	  
Literature	  
Government	  
programme	  
Need	  for	  finance	  
Environmental	  &	  
engineering	  
complexities	  -­‐>	  
Planning	  norms	  
Environmental	  
uncertainty	  /	  
velocity	  -­‐>	  
Planning	  norms	  
Launching	   Capital	  constraints	  
Team	  size	  
	   	   Planning	  norms	  
Environmental	  
velocity	  
Investors	  
Scaling	   	   	   	   Velocity	  
Team	  size	  
Pre	  acquisition	   	   	   	   Acquirer	  
Post	  acquisition	   	   	   	   	  
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, a common moderator of the planning performance relationship is 
environmental uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty and environmental dynamism are often 
used ambiguously and as umbrella terms for various phenomena. Dividing these terms into 
environmental state uncertainty, environment velocity and environmental complexity as 
elaborated in section 2.1.3.2.1 was worth the effort because, in practice, they proved to be 
separate constructs. Together with the emergent construct of engineering complexity, they 
informed certain industry-related planning norms. For instance, in the case of Spreets, 
environmental uncertainty presented itself in the form of not knowing whether and how the 
group-buying model could be applied to the Australia market. Spreets also had to deal with 
environmental velocity because other entrepreneurs were working on establishing group-buying 
businesses in Australia and the market was expected to become highly competitive in very little 
time. Like many other Internet startups that face the same challenges, the entrepreneurs used the 
process of customer development described in Section 4.4.2.2 to validate the business model as 
quickly as possible and, once demand was proven, to ensure that the limited resources available 
were used to build a product based on customer feedback rather than on assumptions. The 
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renewable energy startup, on the other hand, followed planning norms that were relevant for 
their industry and hence very different. The entrepreneurs engaged in sophisticated product and 
plant modelling in form of spreadsheets to break down engineering complexity.. Across the cases 
studied, environmental uncertainty, environmental velocity and environmental complexity as 
well as industry-related planning norms, which are a result of these environmental challenges, 
were the most dominant of all antecedents. 
Other emergent antecedents were peers, investors, acquirer, entrepreneurship literature and the 
government programmes. Peers provided Shane from Immortal Outdoors with advice as to how 
to tackle challenges he faced when building his product. Investors showed Justus from Spreets 
how they built a similar business in another country and their best practices. Yahoo!7, Spreets’ 
acquirer, had clear planning and reporting requirements with which Spreets had to comply. 
Dean from Spreets and Shane from Immortal Outdoors also read books on how to build a new 
venture, which had an impact on the planning process. Finally, the NEIS government 
programme Shane from Immortal Outdoors participated in required Shane to cover certain 
planning issues and to write a business plan. 
The a priori constructs of team size, capital constraints and the need for finance also impacted 
the planning process. As expected, a small team size resulted in less rigid and more informal 
planning in all cases. Capital constraints prevented the owners of Harlem Bar from hiring 
someone to take care of their financial planning, which resulted in the postponing of certain 
planning issues. Furthermore, the two startups that sought external finance had to address certain 
planning issues in order to become fundable. 
Lastly, other venture characteristics assumed to impact planning were not supported by data. It 
seemed that the ventures studied were too early-stage for a high degree of delegation or systems 
and controls to influence planning. 
5.3 Entrepreneur	  and	  other	  planners	  
The a priori framework suggested that the entrepreneur was at the centre of the planning process 
and that pre-entry knowledge, as a characteristic of the entrepreneur, would shape the planning 
process. The data from the cases collected confirmed this (see Table 6). In addition, it was found 
that, for all cases, pre-entry knowledge could be divided further into entrepreneurial knowledge 
and industry knowledge. For instance, in the case of the renewable energy startup, 
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entrepreneurial knowledge facilitated the creation of business plans, pitch decks and investment 
term sheets when applying for grants and seeking investment. Equally important, industry 
knowledge guided the opportunity recognition process as well as the process of product and plant 
modelling. Moreover, data from three of the four cases studied showed that the predisposition of 
the entrepreneur shaped the planning process. Interesting here was the observation that 
predisposition was dynamic the case of Spreets and changed as entrepreneurial knowledge grew. 
More precisely, Justus from Spreets found that the experience he gained as an entrepreneur made 
him understand the value of planning 
Table 6: Cross-case analysis of characteristics of the entrepreneur impacting planning 
	   no	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
proven	  business	  
model	  (Spreets)	  
Nascent	  idea	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Industry	  knowledge	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Industry	  knowledge	  
Actively	  pursuing	  
idea	  
Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Predisposition	  
Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Planning	  
knowledge	  
Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Launching	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  
Predisposition	  
	   	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  –>	  
Predisposition	  
Scaling	   	   	   	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  –>	  
Predisposition	  
Pre	  acquisition	   	   	   	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  –>	  
Predisposition	  
Post	  acquisition	   	   	   	   Industry	  knowledge	  
Entrepreneurial	  
knowledge	  –>	  
Predisposition	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In the case of Spreets, several ‘external’ people were also involved in the planning process. As 
described when discussing antecedents in this chapter, some people and organisations inspired 
entrepreneurs to plan a certain way and acted as antecedents. In some instances, these people 
actually became part of the planning process so that they no longer could be seen as an 
antecedent. These people were peers, investors, people working for the incubator organisation 
and people working for the company that acquired Spreets. 
5.4 Issues	  
As outlined in Table 7, all entrepreneurs faced the issue of discovering and evaluating an 
opportunity at the first stage. In addition, from the second stage onwards, all ventures engaged in 
product development. With the exception of Immortal Outdoors, budgeting and cash flow 
management was of relevance for all ventures to some degree. As for all other issues, there were 
little common themes. Hence, in the cases studied, there was clearly no set sequence of issues to 
be addressed when starting a new venture. This was in clear contrast to the proposal that business 
modelling is a linear, step-by-step process (see Figure 55). 
Figure 55: Business modelling as a linear, step-by-step process 
 
Note. Reprinted from Teece (2010, p. 172) 
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Table 7: Cross-case analysis of planning issues and outcomes along stages 
	   no	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Spreets)	  
Nascent	  
idea	  
Opportunity	  -­‐>	  
business	  idea	  
Opportunity	  -­‐>	  
business	  idea	  
Opportunity	  -­‐>	  
industry	  &	  technology	  
knowledge	  
Opportunity	  -­‐>	  
business	  model	  
Actively	  
pursuing	  
idea	  
Product	  -­‐>	  
design	  
Cost	  estimation	  -­‐>	  
cost	  breakdown	  
(spreadsheet)	  
	  
Product	  -­‐>	  
design	  (spreadsheet)	  /	  
specifications	  
(document)	  
Government	  
programme	  -­‐>	  
business	  plan	  
(document)	  
Product	  -­‐>	  
product	  &	  plant	  
model	  (spreadsheet)	  /	  
Gantt	  chart	  (chart)	  
Investment	  /	  grants	  -­‐>	  
pitch	  deck	  
(presentation)	  /	  
business	  plan	  
(document)	  /	  term	  
sheet	  (document)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
budget	  (spreadsheet)	  
/	  cash	  flow	  forecast	  
(spreadsheet)	  
Costs	  -­‐>	  
cost	  breakdown	  /	  
required	  resources	  
(spreadsheet)	  
Customer	  
development	  -­‐>	  
validation	  
Product	  -­‐>	  
“sprints”	  (document)	  
Launching	   Product	  -­‐>	  
design	  (informal)	  
Operations	  -­‐>	  
various	  outcomes	  
(formal/informal)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
cash	  flow	  reports	  
(document)	  
	   	   Product	  -­‐>	  
“sprints”	  (document)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
budget	  (spreadsheet)	  
Sales	  /	  marketing	  -­‐>	  
to-­‐do	  list	  (email)	  
Scaling	   	   	   	   Product	  -­‐>	  
“sprints”	  (document)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
budget	  (spreadsheet)	  
Sales	  /	  marketing	  /	  
systems	  -­‐>	  
to	  do	  list	  (email)	  
Understanding	  
“levers”	  -­‐>	  
budget	  
Competitive	  
advantage	  -­‐>	  
differentiation	  tactics	   	  
  128 
	   no	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Spreets)	  
Pre	  
acquisition	  
	   	   	   Product	  -­‐>	  
“sprints”	  (document)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
deliverables	  (email)	  /	  
budget,	  KPI	  
(spreadsheet)	  
Sales	  /	  marketing	  -­‐>	  
deliverables	  (email)	  /	  
KPI	  
Vision	  -­‐>	  
strategy	  
Acquisition	  -­‐>	  
business	  plan	  
(document,	  
presentation)	  /	  
budget	  (spreadsheet)	  
Post	  
acquisition	  
	   	   	   Product	  -­‐>	  
“sprints”	  (document)	  
Budgeting	  -­‐>	  
budget	  (spreadsheet)	  
/	  goals	  (presentation)	  
Sales	  /	  marketing	  -­‐>	  
operations	  
(presentation)	  
Vision	  /	  positioning	  /	  
comp.	  advantage	  -­‐>	  
strategy	  
(presentation)	  
 
Note. Outcomes are written in italics. Formal outputs are noted in brackets. 
5.5 Sequences	  of	  actions	  
Various planning issues resulted in a vast array of differing sequences of actions further described 
in Chapter 4. The common ground that some of these sequences shared was the planning mode 
that underpinned them. These planning modes were closely linked to the specific planning issues 
that triggered action, the predisposition of the entrepreneur or the planner and the novelty of the 
business model. 
The entrepreneurs who built Harlem Bar were guided by their intuition. Because they had 
executed similar business models before, the process of opportunity recognition was merely one 
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of evaluating the opportunity, which happened instantly. Their gut instincts assisted the 
entrepreneurs in creating the product and the budget. The process was not very rigid and allowed 
for learning and shiftings of ideas. 
Shane, who founded Immortal Outdoors, said that he created “a business by accident”. He 
clearly followed an effectual path throughout all planning issues. More precisely, he saw 
problems that he could solve with the means available and started to work on solving these 
problems without any bigger vision in mind.  
The opportunity recognition process of the renewable energy startup also followed an effectual 
logic. The first entrepreneur engaged in opportunity seeking to look for an opportunity that, 
with his knowledge as a mechanical engineer, he could turn into a viable business. However, as 
the business grew, the entrepreneurs started to engage in more predictive planning. 
The co-founders of Spreets dealt with many different planning issues. Ever since their incubator 
introduced them to the concept of customer development and the notion of testing before 
building, they followed a ‘discovery-driven’ approach, even after they became acquired. One 
exception, however, was their budget, which was always very predictive. 
Table 8 summarises these insights. Linking planning modes to the archetypes studied showed 
that entrepreneurs developing unproven business models started with an effectual approach. 
Surprisingly, no venture followed the design mode said to inform most prescriptions given to 
entrepreneurs  
Table 8: Planning modes of the cases studied 
	   no	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Spreets)	  
Planning	  
mode	  
Entrepreneurial	   Effectuation	   From	  effectuation	  to	  
prediction	  
Discovery	  
Underlying	  
logic	  
Intuition	   Effectuation	   Effectuation	  /	  
incremental	  planning	  
Experimentation	  
Path	   Deliberate	  /	  plan	  
(informal)	  
Emergent	  /	  pattern	   Deliberate	  and	  
emergent	  /	  plan	  and	  
pattern	  
Deliberate	  and	  
emergent	  /	  plan	  and	  
pattern	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   no	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Harlem)	  
no	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (Immortal	  
Outdoors)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  
unproven	  business	  
model	  (renewable	  
energy	  startup)	  
ext.	  finance	  /	  proven	  
business	  model	  
(Spreets)	  
Planning	  
activity	  
Formulating	  (black	  
box)	  and	  promoting	  
vision	  
Doing	  the	  doable	  with	  
the	  means	  available	  
Doing	  the	  doable	  and	  
increasing	  planning	  as	  
required	  
Testing	  assumptions	  
to	  reduce	  uncertainty	  
Decision	  
maker	  
Entrepreneur	   Entrepreneur	   Entrepreneur	   Entrepreneur	  
Given	  
process	  
No	   No	   No	   Yes	  
Learning	   Partly	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Decision	   	   Top	  -­‐>	  down	   Top	  -­‐>	  down	   Top	  -­‐>	  down	   Top	  -­‐>	  down	  
 
5.6 Outcomes	  
Many prior studies have measured business planning (process) in terms of having a written 
business plan (outcome of a process). The data collected in this thesis showed that one process 
can result in different outcomes and hence process and process outcome need to be better 
distinguished. Table 7 inserted above summarises these outcomes of planning processes in more 
detail and links them to planning issues. 
Opportunity development and business modelling did not result in any formal output. The 
process of product development resulted in many different outcomes. For the co-founders of 
Harlem Bar, the process of building a product involved choosing a “concept” such as Harlem in 
the 1920s, finding the right interior and building the bar. There was no formal outcome of this 
process. For Immortal Outdoors, Shane created lists with features he wanted to see on his website 
and then designed the interface in a spreadsheet. The co-founders of the renewable energy startup 
spent years modelling the product on spreadsheets to find the best technology and configuration 
for their prototypes and plants. Lastly, the co-founders of Spreets put emphasis on receiving 
customer feedback on most product ideas before creating weekly “sprint” lists for their 
developers. Budgeting was mostly done using spreadsheets. One grant the entrepreneurs of the 
renewable energy startup applied for required the entrepreneurs to write a business plan. A 
business plan was also required to complete the government programme in which Shane from 
Immortal Outdoors participated. Deloitte also wrote a business plan in the acquisition process of 
Spreets to communicate the business model to Yahoo!7. In all instances where a business plan 
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was required, the entrepreneurs found this document to be of no internal use. In addition, data 
revealed that a business model can be communicated in many ways and a traditional business 
plan is just one of them. In Spreets’ case, the investors were already familiar with the business 
model and therefore did not need any formal document. The co-founders of the renewable 
energy startup, who pitched to investors familiar with the industry, used presentations and pitch 
decks instead. 
5.7 Summary	  
This chapter discussed how the a priori theoretical framework was developed in the process of 
confronting it with empirical data. 
As suggested by the theory reviewed in Chapter 2, planning can occur on several levels. Data 
showed that opportunity recognition was an additional level separate from business modelling. In 
addition, it was found that different levels of planning build on each other and therefore are 
sequential. 
This chapter also confronted a priori antecedents with data. Whereas some suggested antecedents 
were not supported by data, other antecedents emergent from data. The most influential 
antecedent was industry-related planning norms. In other words, the ventures studied showed 
that planning issues were very much dependent on the industry in which they were operating. 
Furthermore, the role of characteristics of the entrepreneur was examined. The umbrella 
construct of pre-entry knowledge was divided into entrepreneurial and industry knowledge. 
Predisposition of the entrepreneur was another characteristic that emerged from data. It was also 
found that, in one of the cases, ‘external’ people became part of the planning process. 
The section devoted to planning issues explained how the entrepreneurs of all ventures studied 
faced their own planning issues and, with the exception of opportunity recognition, product 
development and budgeting, no commonalities were found. The lack of such patterns questions 
theory that suggested that new ventures go through a set sequence of planning issues. 
The planning modes that underpinned sequences of actions were also studied. Surprisingly, no 
venture operated in the design mode said to inform most prescriptions given to entrepreneurs. In 
addition, data revealed that the two cases with unproven business models started with an 
effectual approach. 
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Lastly, when analysing the outcomes of the planning process, it became clear that despite the 
practice of most prior studies, the distinction between planning process and outcome of such 
process is important. In addition, entrepreneurs reported that business plans, such as the ones 
often promoted by governmental agencies and educators, were required to communicate the 
business model to investors, acquirer or the governmental agencies not familiar with the business 
model. Besides such communicating, writing a traditional business plan did not result in any 
benefit for the entrepreneurs. 
The next section reviews the insights gathered in this chapter in the light of their contribution. 
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6 CONTRIBUTION	  AND	  FUTURE	  AREAS	  OF	  RESEARCH	  
6.1 Theoretical	  contribution	  
Fields of academic research have looked at narrow aspects of entrepreneurial planning. Most of 
these studies used quantitative methods to measure the impact of planning on new venture 
performance. Despite decades of inquiring, the results have pointed “inconclusively to any 
association between business plans and venture performance” (Burke et al., 2010, p. 392) and an 
“intense debate” (Brinckmann et al., 2010, p. 24) still surrounds the question of how 
entrepreneurs are best advised to plan. 
This inconclusiveness is not surprising given that theory testing has preceded theory building 
(Dencker et al., 2009). The understanding of planning that underpinned these studies has been 
both limited (Burke et al., 2010) and based on assumptions rather than theory. The goal of this 
theory-building research is to produce a better understanding of what entrepreneurial planning is 
and how it unfolds. By combining various concepts from narrow streams of planning literature 
rooted in entrepreneurship and strategic management, a preliminary understanding of 
entrepreneurial early-stage planning was created. This theoretical framework was then confronted 
with qualitative data collected from four cases. The refined framework highlighted antecedents, 
issues, sequences of actions and outcomes of entrepreneurial planning as well as the role of 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and other planners in the planning process. 
In regard to overcoming the inconclusiveness mentioned above, the literature reviewed showed 
that planning has mostly been measured in terms of having a written business plan. This was 
contrasted by data revealing that in the cases studied, a business plan was merely one of many 
possible outcomes of the planning process. The framework developed can be used to create 
measures that better reflect the complex and multifaceted nature of such planning. More 
generally speaking, a clearer understanding of how entrepreneurial planning unfolds is expected 
to lay the foundation for various types of future studies concerned with entrepreneurial planning. 
6.2 Methodological	  contribution	  
Most scholars have approached the studying of entrepreneurial planning from a positivist stance. 
Quantitative methods have been used to measure relationships between two variables. 
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Surprisingly, these relationships pointed in very different directions. Consequently, researchers 
have introduced empirically ungrounded moderators in order to better understand the 
complexity of the phenomenon studied. The introduction of such moderators has done little in 
producing more conclusive results. Whereas statistical methods are suitable for testing theory 
across a wide sample, they are inefficient at building theory and creating an understanding of 
complex phenomena. Therefore, this thesis employed a different methodology. 
Existing constructs relevant to entrepreneurial planning were combined into a more holistic 
theoretical framework. To confront this theory with data, four new ventures were studied using 
qualitative case research as the chosen methodology. By iterating through the hermeneutical 
circle and continuously moving between data and theory, an improved understanding gradually 
emerged. 
The findings indicate that the methodological approach provided adequate and usable research 
data for creating a more advanced understanding of the process of early-stage entrepreneurial 
planning and its complexity. This attempt to grasp the multifaceted phenomenon, has, at least to 
some extent, increased knowledge about the usability of the existing theories and models, and the 
reality entrepreneurs face when starting a new venture. The approach seemed well suited for the 
task of developing existing and complex theory in the field of entrepreneurship. 
6.3 Managerial	  implications	  
The insights provided are also of relevance to agents advising entrepreneurs as to how to plan. 
Literature reviewed showed that governmental agencies, textbook writers and educators 
predominantly promote the traditional business-planning framework. This framework has its 
roots in strategic management literature and planning in this mode is a process of rational 
decision making taking place “as a linear progression from initial aspiration to final result” 
(Sminia, 2009, p. 98). Surprisingly, none of the ventures studied operated in this logic. With 
respect to business plans, it was found that writing such a plan only made sense when there was a 
need to communicate the business model to external people not familiar with the industry. There 
were no other benefits from writing such a plan, which was said to be a very time-consuming task 
of 200 hours or more. This thesis provided detailed observations outlining the alternative 
planning modes in which the ventures studied operated. 
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6.4 Limitations	  and	  avenues	  for	  further	  research	  
In order to obtain a holistic understanding of the phenomenon studied, this thesis collected data 
from four new ventures. This small sample size does not allow for any statistical generalisation. 
Therefore, theory testing across a larger sample size is required to verify the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
In addition, all cases studied were Sydney-based, which did not allow for an understanding of 
whether the cultural background of the entrepreneur affected planning. The theoretical 
framework could be applied to entrepreneurs from other cultures to better understand whether 
the cultural background of the entrepreneur has an impact on the planning process. 
As another characteristic of the entrepreneur, pre-entry knowledge shaped the planning process 
in the cases studied. This thesis did not ‘control’ for nascent versus serial entrepreneurs or for the 
level of pre-entry industry knowledge. To better understand how such characteristics form the 
planning process, scholars could pay closer attention to these differences and draw on methods 
from cognitive psychology to further explore the black box of planning. 
Findings also revealed that opportunity recognition processes differed in the archetypes studied. 
However, data was too thin to produce a deep understanding of such processes. Incorporating 
theories from opportunity recognition literature into the theoretical framework presented in this 
thesis and collecting data from different archetypes of new ventures could further advance our 
understanding of differences in such processes. 
Furthermore, the results showed that industry-related planning norms had a great impact on the 
planning process. Adding more industries and studying several new ventures in each industry is 
expected to further reveal the degree to which planning depends on the industry the 
entrepreneurs are operating in. 
As a last suggestion for avenues of further research, this thesis only studied the immediate 
benefits and effects of certain planning processes. Future studies could further explore how 
certain planning processes affect and benefit the new venture in the middle and long term. 
To conclude, the theoretical framework developed in this research provides a bigger picture of 
the phenomenon of entrepreneurial planning and a map of how the individual parts it consists of 
fit together. It lays a good foundation for future research seeking to study these individual parts 
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in more detail. The ability of this framework to raise questions and to urge further research can 
be considered to be one of its important and central contributions. 
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8 	   APPENDICES	  
Appendix A 
Table 9: Main arguments pro and contra entrepreneurial planning since 2003 
Study	   Process	  
(planning)	  
or	  outcome	  
(plan)	  
pro	  or	  
contra	  
Reasoning	   Dataset	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   plan	   pro	   increases	  the	  level	  of	  resources	  available	  to	  
the	  venture	  (meta	  moderator)	  
England	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   plan	   pro	   enhancing	  the	  efficacy	  of	  existing	  resources	  
(meta	  moderator)	  
England	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   plan	   pro	   help	  raise	  entrepreneurial	  capabilities	   England	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   plan	   pro	   may	  support	  improvisational	  activities	  by	  
enhancing	  entrepreneurial	  decision	  making	  
England	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   plan	   pro	   helps	  improving	  the	  managerial	  capabilities	  
to	  learn	  and	  introduce	  new	  routines	  
England	  
Burke	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   planning	   pro	   can	  highlight	  the	  difficulty	  of	  predicting	  
market	  uncertainties	  and	  hence	  actually	  
prime	  entrepreneurs	  to	  think	  and	  respond	  
more	  effectively	  
England	  
Dimov	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   planning	   pro	   improves	  decision	  making	  and	  facilitates	  
resource	  management	  
USA	  
Dencker	  et	  al.	  (2009)	   planning	   contra	   source	  of	  inertia	  for	  new	  firms	  
	  
may	  lead	  to	  a	  false	  illusion	  of	  control	  that	  
decreases	  the	  organisation’s	  receptiveness	  
to	  signals	  
Bavaria	  
(Germany)	  
Brinckmann	  (2007)	   planning	   pro	   helps	  clarify	  the	  desired	  future	   Germany	  
Lange	  et	  al.	  (2007)	   plan	   neither	   helps	  articulate	  planning	  issues,	  increases	  
chances	  to	  raise	  funds,	  may	  help	  attract	  
critical	  customers,	  advisers,	  key	  managers,	  
critical	  vendors	  and	  directors	  
USA	  
Liao	  &	  Gartner	  (2006)	   planning	   pro	   enables	  nascent	  entrepreneurs	  to	  more	  
effectively	  identify	  what	  other	  actions	  to	  
accomplish	  
USA	  
Honig	  &	  Karlsson	  
(2004)	  
planning	   neither	   a	  result	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  government	  
and	  mimetic	  behaviour	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
copying	  the	  practices	  of	  successful	  
businesses	  in	  a	  particular	  industry	  
Sweden	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Study	   Process	  
(planning)	  
or	  outcome	  
(plan)	  
pro	  or	  
contra	  
Reasoning	   Dataset	  
Shane	  &	  Delmar	  
(2004)	  
planning	   pro	   allows	  a	  decision	  maker	  to	  better	  analyse	  
complex	  activities	  in	  which	  many	  factors	  
interact	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   pro	   helps	  firm	  founders	  to	  undertake	  venture	  
development	  activities	  because	  planning	  
facilitates	  goal	  attainment	  in	  many	  domains	  
of	  human	  action	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   pro	   helps	  firm	  founders	  to	  make	  decisions	  more	  
quickly	  than	  with	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  learning	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   pro	   provides	  tools	  for	  managing	  the	  supply	  and	  
demand	  of	  resources	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  
avoids	  time-­‐consuming	  bottlenecks	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   pro	   helps	  firm	  founders	  to	  turn	  abstract	  goals	  
into	  concrete	  operational	  step	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   pro	   identifies	  action	  steps	  to	  achieve	  broader	  
goals	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   contra	   takes	  time	  away	  from	  more	  valuable	  firm	  
organising	  actions	  that	  signal	  the	  'reality'	  of	  
the	  new	  venture	  to	  stakeholders.	  
Sweden	  
Delmar	  &	  Shane	  
(2003)	  
planning	   contra	   firm	  founders	  possess	  attributes	  that	  make	  
them	  better	  off	  relying	  on	  intuition	  than	  
engaging	  in	  planning	  
Sweden	  
 
Note. All studies were quantitative studies measuring the planning performance relationship. The 
arguments put forward are mostly of conceptual nature seeking to explain the outcome of the 
statistics. 
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Table 10: Studies testing the planning performance link in new ventures since 2000 
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Table 11: Moderators of the planning performance relationship in new ventures since 2000 
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Measuring trustworthiness 
In positivist research the “trustworthiness” of a study is undisputedly measured by “conventional 
benchmarks of ‘rigour’: internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 196) (see Table 12: column 2). On the other hand, in interpretive research, 
there is an ongoing dialogue about the factors that make a study worthy of trust. In an early 
attempt, Lincoln & Guba (1985) mapped these positivist quality criteria to more abstract terms 
that apply to all theoretical perspectives (see Table 12: column 1): truth value, applicability, 
consistency and neutrality. Based on these insights, the authors developed equivalent terms for 
interpretivist research (see Table 12: column 3): credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. Drawing on Lincoln & Guba’s work, Miles & Huberman provided alternative 
terms for some of these principles and added an additional benchmark termed “application” (see 
Table 12: column 4). This fifth criterion addresses the question of “pragmatic validity” or 
whether the study has the potential to do something for the researchers, the participants and the 
consumers of the study. 
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Table 12: Criteria of trustworthiness 
Overarching	   	  
Lincoln	  &	  Guba	  (1985,	  p.	  
290ff)	  
Positivist	  
Lincoln	  &	  Guba	  (1985,	  p.	  290ff)	  
Interpretivist	  I	  
Lincoln	  &	  Guba	  
(1985,	  p.	  290ff)	  
Interpretivist	  II	  
Miles	  &	  
Huberman	  
(1994,	  p.	  277ff)	  
Truth	  value:	  
“How	  can	  one	  establish	  
confidence	  in	  the	  ‘truth’	  of	  
the	  findings	  of	  a	  particular	  
inquiry	  […]	  ?”	  
Internal	  validity:	  
“Extent	  to	  which	  variations	  in	  an	  
outcome	  (dependent)	  variable	  can	  
be	  attributed	  to	  controlled	  variation	  
in	  an	  independent	  variable”	  
Credibility:	  
Findings	  “are	  credible	  
to	  the	  constructors	  of	  
the	  original	  multiple	  
realities”	  
Authenticity	  
Applicability:	  
“How	  can	  one	  determine	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  findings	  
of	  a	  particular	  inquiry	  have	  
applicability	  in	  other	  contexts	  
or	  with	  other	  subjects	  
(respondents)?”	  
External	  validity	  /	  Generalisability:	  
“The	  approximate	  validity	  with	  which	  
we	  infer	  that	  the	  presumed	  causal	  
relationship	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  
and	  across	  alternate	  measures	  of	  the	  
cause	  and	  effect	  and	  across	  different	  
types	  of	  persons,	  settings,	  and	  
times”	  
Transferability:	  
Enough	  information	  
is	  provided	  for	  
someone	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  judge	  whether	  
findings	  can	  be	  
transferred	  to	  
another	  context	   	  
Fittingness	  
Consistency:	  
“How	  can	  one	  determine	  
whether	  the	  findings	  of	  an	  
inquiry	  would	  be	  repeated	  if	  
the	  inquiry	  were	  replicated	  
[…]	  ?”	  
Reliability:	  
Extent	  to	  which	  “each	  repetition	  of	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  same[…]	  
instruments	  to	  the	  same	  units	  will	  
yield	  similar	  measurement”	  
Dependability:	  
Findings	  are	  
consistent	  
Auditability	  
Neutrality:	  
“How	  can	  one	  establish	  the	  
degree	  to	  which	  the	  findings	  
of	  an	  inquiry	  are	  determined	  
by	  the	  subjects	  […]	  and	  not	  by	  
the	  biases	  […]	  of	  the	  
inquirer?”	  
Objectivity:	  
“Phenomena	  in	  the	  public	  domain”	  
Confirmability:	  
Intersubjective	  
agreement	  
Confirmability	  
	   	   	   Application:	  
The	  potential	  of	  
the	  study	  to	  do	  
something	  
Note. Adapted from Cook & Campbell (1979, p. 37), Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & Allen (1993, 
p. 133) and Schwartz-Shea (2006, p. 94) 
Among these different views on how trustworthiness can be measured, Miles & Huberman’s 
(1994) as well as Lincoln & Guba’s (1985) criteria are suitable for this research. However, it 
should be noted that confirmability, which has also been termed neutrality, is only partly 
  152 
applicable to a hermeneutical piece of research like this. Neutrality or the prevention of “putting 
questions not directly to ‘Nature Itself’ but through an intervening medium that ‘bends’ the 
response” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 293) is against the core idea of such research in which the 
researcher and his or her experience and knowledge act as an instrument in developing 
understanding. 
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Means to establish trustworthiness 
Equally important to the question of what these criteria of trustworthiness are, is the question of 
how they can be met. Lincoln & Guba (1985, p. 301ff) provided good suggestions (see Table 13: 
column 3). Each paragraph in this section addresses a set of means surrounding one measure of 
trustworthiness. 
Table 13: Means to establish trustworthiness in qualitative research 
Interpretivist	  criterion	  
Miles	  &	  Huberman	  (1994,	  p.	  277ff)	  
Means	  to	  establish	  
trustworthiness	  
Lincoln	  &	  Guba	  (1985,	  p.	  
290ff)	  
Means	  to	  establish	  
trustworthiness	  
Creswell	  (1998,	  p.	  191f)	  
Authenticity:	  
“Do	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  make	  sense?	  Are	  
they	  credible	  to	  the	  people	  we	  study	  and	  to	  our	  
readers?	  Do	  we	  have	  an	  authentic	  portrait	  of	  
what	  we	  were	  looking	  at?”	  
Prolonged	  engagement	  
Persistent	  observation	  
Triangulation	  
Peer	  debriefing	  
Member	  checks	  
Prolonged	  engagement	  
	  
Triangulation	  
Peer	  debriefing	  
Member	  checks	  
Discrepant	  information	  
Fittingness:	  
“Are	  they	  [the	  conclusions]	  transferable	  to	  other	  
contexts?	  Do	  they	  ‘fit’"?	  
Thick	  descriptions	  
Purposive	  selecting	  
Thick	  descriptions	  
Dependability:	  
“The	  underlying	  issue	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  
process	  of	  the	  study	  is	  consistent,	  reasonably	  
stable	  over	  time	  and	  across	  researchers	  and	  
methods.	  […}	  Have	  things	  been	  done	  with	  
reasonable	  care?”	  
Dependability	  audit	   Dependability	  audit	  
Confirmability:	  
Intersubjective	  agreement	  
Confirmability	  audit	   Confirmability	  audit	  
Clarification	  of	  researcher’s	  bias	  
Application:	  
The	  potential	  of	  the	  study	  to	  do	  something	  
	   	  
 
To enhance the criterion of authenticity or truth value, Lincoln & Guba suggest five major 
techniques. First, prolonged engagement can be undertaken to invest sufficient time in data 
collection, to get to know the “culture” or the business, to validate data and to build trust with 
the participants. This provides the researcher with a broad scope. Second, while collecting such a 
broad range of data, the authors encourage the researchers to focus and study some of these 
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influences in depth. This is referred to as persistent observation. Triangulation, the third mode of 
improving the likelihood of credible findings and interpretations, involves using multiple copies 
of one type of source, different sources of the same information, different data collection 
methods, different designs or multiple investigators. This provides the researcher with “multiple 
lines of sight” (Berg, 2004, p. 5). The fourth technique is peer debriefing, “the process of 
exposing oneself to a disinterested peer in a manner paralleling an analytic session and for the 
purpose of exploring aspects of the inquiry that might otherwise remain only implicit within the 
inquirer’s mind” (p. 308). The fifth mean, members checks, is the verification of “analytical 
categories, interpretations, and conclusions” with respondents (p. 315) and according to the 
authors “the most crucial technique for establishing credibility”. Other than triangulation, it 
focuses on constructions rather than on data. This can be done formally in a separate meeting 
and informally during the interview by rephrasing or summarising the respondents’ answer 
during the interview. It should be noted that some researchers warn that formal member checks 
may decrease the quality of the research because respondents sometimes take the opportunity to 
cover up certain issues. Creswell (2009, p. 192) adds an additional mean to increase credibility, 
the presentation of negative or discrepant information, which while running counter to the 
themes, accounts for the different perspectives real life is composed of. Lastly, Lincoln & Guba 
also mention two more means to establish trustworthiness: negative case analysis and referential 
adequacy. Negative case analysis is the process of continuously refining “a hypothesis until it 
accounts for all known cases without exception [emphasis removed]” (p. 309). This rather 
positivist approach is not compatible with an interpretivist study and therefore not accounted for 
in this research. Referential adequacy is the archival of a portion of data before analysing it and 
using it later to test the validity of findings. Whereas generally speaking this is a valid approach, 
in a qualitative thesis like this, in which access to data is limited, the data available is of better use 
when being fed into the hermeneutical cycle immediately after collection and being validated by 
iterating through the circle as described in section 3.1.2. 
The second criterion is fittingness or transferability to other contexts. Other than with 
authenticity, Lincoln & Guba did not write a comprehensive chapter on this issue, which 
indicates that transferability is not a main concern to the typical interpretivist researcher. The 
theories interpretivists produce are bound by context and time. Whether these theories hold true 
in another context or in the same context in another time “depends upon the degree of similarity 
between sending and receiving (or earlier and later) contexts” (p. 316). Hence, the goal here is 
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not to create generalisable theories but rather to provide enough data for someone else to assess 
whether such a transfer to another context is possible. This is achieved by providing thick 
descriptions as well as a wide array of information through “purposeful sampling”. Both 
techniques were not further specified. Geertz (2003) is more elaborative on the former issue. 
Thick descriptions should include the context in which action or behaviour arises so that this 
action or behaviour becomes meaningful to an outsider. “Purposeful sampling”, on the other 
hand, ensures “the widest possible range of information for inclusion in the thick descriptions” 
(p. 316). In an interpretivist case study like this, this rather positivist term can be translated into 
a purposeful selection of cases, participants and other documents. 
The third criterion, dependability or consistency, can be met by having someone performing an 
enquiry audit of the entire project based on the concept of a fiscal audit. By examining the 
process of the enquiry and by determining its acceptability, the auditor gives credence to the 
consistency of the enquiry. 
The same concept applies to the fourth criterion, confirmability or neutrality. By examining the 
data, findings, interpretations and recommendations and by confirming that data and logical 
reasoning informing every construction, interpretation or conclusion, the auditor attests to the 
neutrality of the research. As an outsider not being familiar with the researcher or the project, he 
or she can provide an objective assessment (Creswell, 2009). In addition, Creswell (2009) 
encourages researchers to clarify the bias they bring to the study. As outlined in section 3.2.3, the 
construct of neutrality conflicts with the nature of hermeneutical research. 
Lastly, Miles & Huberman(1994, p. 280) stress the importance of producing research that does 
something “for its participants, both researchers and researched–and for its consumers”. This 
includes providing findings that “have a catalyzing effect leading to specific actions […] [that] 
actually help solve the local problem”. In addition, users of the findings are supposed to “learn” 
and develop new capacities as well as experience a “sense of empowerment”. 
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Appendix F 
Summary of the bias I bring to this research 
During my undergraduate studies at the University of St. Gallen, I attended an entrepreneurship 
class. The assignment for this class was taking a business idea and writing a business plan based 
on it. I was fascinated with this structured, step-by-step approach from idea to business model. 
Later, ten months after I commenced my postgraduate research at the University of Sydney, I 
started working for a startup named Spreets, which turned out to become one of the case studies 
in this research. Spreets first operated from the incubator’s office and I met plenty of people 
involved in Internet startups. These people all had a very different approach to planning than 
what I was familiar with. As they explained to me, the focus was on validating the assumptions 
you make when planning rather than writing long plans full of untested assumptions. The 
methodology they used was called Customer Development 
(http://steveblank.com/category/customer-development/) and Lean Startup 
(http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/). As I became more involved in the Web startup scene 
and co-founded such a venture myself, I started to understand the power of testing assumptions, 
learning and iterating quickly. At the same time, whenever going to events for entrepreneurs 
organised by the government, the same tools I was introduced to during my undergraduate 
studies were promoted. Ever since I noticed this discrepancy, I questioned myself whether 
Customer Development and Lean Startup were only suitable for Internet startups or whether the 
traditional business plan framework was “old news”. I could not find an answer to this question 
in academia and therefore I decide to write a theory-building thesis on the different forms in 
which planning can occur. 
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